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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
China is a vast country with a population of over one 
billion people. The arable land in China is, however, only about 
95.72 million hectares, or 0.087 hectares per capita on average 
(State Statistical Bureau, 1989). With the large population, 
limited arable land, poor infrastructure facilities, and 
restrained foreign exchange, agricultural development has 
always been the top priority in the Chinese economy. 
Soon after the three year economic recovery following the 
foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the 
collectivization characterized by Mutual Aid Team, and later on 
Cooperatives were initiated. Six years later, the Rural People's 
Commune system integrating both government administration and 
economic management was established. From then on, China had 
followed a highly centralized planned economic system. The major 
features of this system are; (1) the "three-level ownership, the 
People's Commune, the production brigade, and the production 
team, with the last as the basic production and accounting unit; 
(2) The state mandatory plan; and (3) the state monopoly for 
purchasing and marketing major farm products-grain, cotton, 
velvet, and oil-bearing crops and the state fixed purchasing 
over 70 farm products. Experienced over time, this system had 
been proved to be unfit for China. 
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Since late 1978, China has been in a course of 
transformation from a rigid centrally planned economic system to 
a mixed system of planning and markets. The process of 
reforming the Chinese agriculture can be characterized by three 
stages. 
The first stage was from December 1978 to October 1984. 
The reforms in this stage aimed at improving management and 
providing incentives to raise productivity. The new policies 
have included introducing various production responsibility 
systems, allowing farmers to sell part of their surplus in local 
markets, and raising state purchasing prices. By 1983, the 
household responsibility system became a widely accepted form of 
organization. By the end of 1984, about 98 percent of rural 
households were converted into various types of production 
responsibility systems, 96.6 percent of them were involved in 
the household responsibility system (State Statistical Bureau, 
1985, 1987). 
The new policies brought about significant impacts on 
Chinese agricultural development. The nation's total 
agricultural output value increased at an average annual rate of 
9 percent, or 6.7 percent after deducting the output value of 
village-run industries. Farmer income per capita, with price 
rises factored in, rose by a record rate of 14.8 percent per 
year (Duan, 1987). The total grain output increased from 304.8 
million tons in 1978 to 402.3 million tons in 1984, at a record 
rate of 5.6 percent per annuam (Gao, 1990). It is of interest 
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to note that the remarkable increase in grain production was 
realized as the areas sown to grain crops was reduced by 7.7 
million hectares. This implies that rapid increase in grain 
production was achieved mainly from substantial rises in yields, 
as reflected in statistics that yields increased from 2,535 kg 
in 1978 to 3,615 kg in 1984. As land and labor shifted to other 
production activities, the non-grain production was flourised. 
The second stage ran from October 1984 to December 1987. 
The main objectives are to adjust the rural economic structure 
through market machenism and take local comparative advantages 
to move from a self-sufficient rural economy to a planned 
commodity economy. While the reform measures initiated in the 
first stage continued in practice, the system of state monopoly 
for purchasing and marketing over the four major farm products 
was replaced by a system of contracted purchase. All products 
not purchased under the contract were allowed to be disposed of 
on free markets. The state fixed purchasing over 70 farm 
products was abolished and farmers could now deal with their 
outputs freely. 
The factor markets were opened. Land could be leased out 
for rent, labor could be hired within limitation, and interest 
could be charged for credit. However, the extent of 
transactions was limited and the forms of transaction were 
restricted (Lin, 1988). 
The positive results include the followings. First, crop 
planting structure has changed, namely the areas sown to grain 
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and cotton were reduced and the areas of oil-bearing crop, 
suger-bearing crop, hemp, flax, other cash crop, and vegetables 
were expanded. The proportion of grain, cash crop, and other 
crops altered from 78:14:8 in 1984 to 75:16:9 in 1986 (Duan, 
1987). Next, the livestock and fishery sectors developed 
dramatically. The outputs of meat including pork, beef, and 
mutton, milk, and aquatic products increased by 13.9 percent, 
14.2 percent, and 12.5 percent in 1985, respectively; and 9 
percent, 14.4 percent, and 15.3 percent in 1986, respectively 
(Duan, 1987). Finally, rural industry, construction, 
transportation, commerce have also been stimulated. The output 
of these sectors reached 348.2 billion yuan, a 50 percent growth 
over 1984 and accouting for 46.9 percent of total rural output 
value (Duan, 1987). As a result of overall development, total 
value of agricultural output increased by 15.6 percent in 1985 
and 11.6 percent in 1986 and farmer's net income per capita rose 
by 8.4 percent in 1985 and 3.2 percent in 1986 (Duan, 1987). 
The negative results were also observed. The outputs of 
grain and cotton fluctuated. Guo, Perkins, and Carter and 
Zhong, among others, argued that the reduction in grain and 
cotton were mainly attributed to low output prices relative to 
other farm outputs and increasing input prices. As a result, 
marginal revenue from grain or cotton production was lower than 
for other agricultural production. Consequently, investment in 
grain and cotton production were reduced leading the deduction 
in production. 
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The third stage ranges from October 1987 to the present. 
The necessity of political reform was recognized and added to 
the reform agenda. Since then China has been in the era of 
comprehensive reform involving all areas of the society. This 
in return has significant impacts on the agricultural 
development. The total agricultural output value in 1988 
reached 561.8 billion yuan, 3.2 percent increase over 1987. 
Production of grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops dropped by 
varying degrees. By contrast, other crop productions were 
continually increased. Livestock and aquatic production rose 
dramatically with meat, milk, and aquatic products up by 10.2, 
11.7, and 9.5 percent over previous year, respectively. Farmer 
net income per capita was 545 yuan in 1988, 17.7 percent, or 6.3 
percent higher after taking inflation into account, than that in 
1987 (State Statistical Bureau, 1989). 
Being aware of achievements and problems in agriculture, 
the government announced that the agricultural reforms will be 
kept moving in the same direction and the existing problems 
should be solved as the reforms are deepened. The reforms 
declared to remain unchanged comprise "(1) the policy regarding 
the contract responsibility system based on mainly on household 
management and linking remuneration with output will remain 
unchanged; (2) with common prosperity as the goal, the policy of 
allowing and encouraging some regions and people to prosper 
before others will not be altered; (3) the policy of 'never 
slacking our efforts to boost grain production, enthusiastically 
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developing a diversified economy, steadily readjusting, and 
optimizing the rural production structure will not be changed; 
(4) the policy of encouraging and guiding the development of 
township enterprises will remain consistent; (5) the policy of 
developing a diversified economy under the prerequisite that the 
mainstay of public ownership is upheld will be kept unchanged; 
and (6) for the main agricultural and sideline products, 
the marketing and purchasing policy which combines a planned 
economy with regulation by the market will remain consistent" 
(Tian, 1990). 
1.2 Problems 
Most of the literature on the Chinese agricultural economy 
focuses on analysis of central planning issues. This is 
because Chinese economy followed a central planning system from 
the early 1950s to the late 1970s. Numerous works on these 
issues were developed in 1960s and 1970s. Most of them were, 
however, descriptive in nature, because of unavailability of 
adequate data and limited access to the economy by outside 
scholars. 
To provide more information on Chinese agriculture, Liu and 
Yeh (1963), Perkins (1969), Chao (1970), and Eckstein (1980), 
among others, have interpolated various estimates of 
agricultural outputs, inputs, investments, and other indicators. 
However, since these estimates, made one way another outside 
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China, were based on the Chinese official statistical data or 
official media of reports, there is no evidence that these 
estimates reflect more accurate information than those 
published inside. 
Early attempts to develop mathematical models representing 
Chinese agriculture included Schran's (1964) simultaneous 
equation model and Wang's (1966) single equation complete model. 
To evaluate the effects of the rural institutions on 
agricultural yields, Schran set up eight simultaneous equations. 
Since it is difficult to judge whether these functional forms 
are correct representation of Chinese agriculture, and since 
some of the variables were difficult to quantify, for instance, 
ideological awareness, the usefulness of the Schran's model in 
statistical analysis was limited. 
Recognizing the shortcomings of Schran's model, Wang built 
a short run regression model for direct statistical analysis of 
the relationships between farm output and technical 
modernization, institutional change, farmer's income, and 
weather. Although a single-equation complete model served the 
purpose of testing the hypotheses involved, it is too simplistic 
to provide a basis for a full economic analysis of policy 
impacts on agricultural output. 
In the early 1980s, it was accepted, that, in the centrally 
planned economies, due to government promotional effects, 
certain essential economic variables interacted with one another 
in reflecting economicly rational process. These behavior 
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patterns for economic variables can be formulated into model 
built with a consistent economic rational. Most of the last 
decade can be considered the period of pioneering work in terms 
of quantitative analysis of Chinese agriculture using 
descriptive and behavioral models. 
Using the combined quadratic time trend and ARIMA (1,1) 
model, Noh (1983) studied and projected China's grain production 
and consumption. His time series models were suited to analyze 
and forecast the broad trend. However, without linking the 
grain production or consumption with policy variables, the 
economic determinants that the planner uses and that how the 
producers or consumers respond to changes in policy alternatives 
cannot be evaluated. 
Ho (1982) modeled China's central planning process through 
the Leontief-type of input-output analysis to investigate the 
Chinese government's role in economic performance. Ho also 
developed an econometric model containing nine equations. Each 
of the nine equations including agricultural output and the 
rural labor force, was then estimated individually. Utilizing 
a piecewise linear regression approach. Tang (1984) also 
examined agricultural policy cycles, Cobb-Douglas function of 
labor productivity, and some other economic variables. 
Halbrendt et al. (1989) utilized fixed and stochastic 
coefficients regression techniques to analyze production, 
consumption, and trade of individual crops, namely corn and 
wheat. Halbrendt et al. (1989) also built a spatial equilibrium 
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model of inter-provincial rice trade in China. Unfortunately, 
results of these efforts are partial in nature. These partial 
equilibrium analyses ignore the linkages either among the 
markets in the agricultural sector, resource markets, or between 
the agricultural sector to the remainder of the economy. As a 
result, the analyses of impacts of policy on agriculture is 
likely to be misleading. The contribution of these models to 
policy analysis was thus limited. 
Chow (1985) is the first one to have more fully applied the 
basic tools of economic analysis, including macro- and 
microeconomic theory and econometric methods, to study the 
Chinese economy. Following a theoretical exploration, he used 
various quantitative approaches, such as Cobb-Douglas production 
function, linear regression, multiplier-accelerator models, 
systems of linear difference equations, etc., to conduct an 
economic analysis of agriculture, industry, consumption, 
national income, human capital, and foreign trade and 
investment, respectively. Although Chow's work provides a 
significant step in understanding the Chinese economy, the 
results are subjected to the same limitations of the partial 
equilibrium analysis. Also, his model of agricultural sector 
did not have commodity detail. 
More recently, mathematical and econometric methods became 
more accepted as a technique for the analysis of economic 
effects of agricultural policies for central planning countries 
and some more sophisticated and elaborated models were 
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constructed. The National Model for the Hungarian Food and 
Agriculture Sector (Csabki, 1981), among others, is a such good 
example. However, building mathematical and econometric 
national model for the Chinese economy has not been given wide 
attention in the literature on centally planned economy. 
It is well known that a general equilibrium framework is 
the appropriate approach for evaluating the full economic 
consequences of policies affecting the farm sector. The Basic 
Linked System (Fischer et al., 1988), a global general 
equilibrium model developed at the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), is one such approach for 
national and global agricultural policy evaluation. The China 
model in the Basic Linked System (Neunteufel, 1985), a country-
specific model, follows the general equilibrium framework. 
However, there are two problems associated with the IIASA China 
national model. One is that it is incorporating the economic 
system prior to 1978 when China started the agricultural reform. 
It is now significantly out of date and not suitable for policy 
analysis of the current economic system. The other problem is 
that the model is too simple to be used as a tool for policy 
evaluation. 
Some research results can be found in the literature on the 
current mixed system of planning and markets (Tang, 1980; Cheng, 
1982; Hsu, 1982; Barker et al., 1982; Huan, 1985; Song, 1986; 
Xue, 1987) that can be used as a basis for a more elaborate 
model. Most of these describe the institutional changes 
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and study the causes and effects of the shift from commune 
system to responsibility system. And majority of the results 
are descriptive. The exceptions can be observed in two 
categories. One category is to provide quantitative analysis of 
the causes and effects of the institutional transformation using 
econometric models. Another category is to incorporate the 
current economic system and agricultural policies in building 
theoretical and empirical models for the Chinese agricultural 
sector. 
Of the first group researchers, Lin (1988) and McMillan et 
al. (1989) are noted worthy. Introducing the supervision 
and cost of supervision in his theoretical model, Lin drew three 
hypotheses and tested them with empirical data before and after 
the institutional reform. The accepted hypotheses include; 
(1) the rate of adopting the household responsibility system in 
an area was a function of the gains and costs of shifting to the 
new system in that area; (2) the effects of the institutional 
change in agricultural production from the production team 
system to the household responsibility system mainly involved 
the augmentation of effort supply, both in terms of quantity of 
work and quality of work; and (3) the change from the production 
team system to the household responsibility system should have 
a positive effect on agricultural production. Yet, its effects 
on household sideline production was indeterminate. 
McMillan et al. employed a production function 
incorporating a method decomposing the effect of price increase 
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and introduction of the responsibility system. The associated 
empirical results suggest that 22 percent of the increase in 
productivity in Chinese agriculture between 1978 and 1984 was 
due to higher prices and 78 percent to new production 
responsibility system. 
Theoretical and empirical work on Chinese agriculture under 
the current mixed system of planning and markets can also be 
found. Of the authors who have investigated the model of 
current Chinese agriculture, mention should be made of Carter 
and Zhong (1988), Sicular (1989), and Pan and Johnson (1990a, 
1990b). Carter and Zhong built and estimated a model for 
Chinese grain production reflecting the features of current 
system. They explicitly introduced average grain purchasing 
price index in the functions of grain sown area and grain yield. 
Total grain production is then equal to the product of these two 
functions. 
Sicular developed a theoretical model in a general 
equilibrium framework. She showed that in the presence of state 
planning, economic agent's marginal decisions are guided only by 
market prices. State prices and quotas do not directly 
influence the production choice. She pointed out that the plan, 
however, affect levels of trade on the market and with the 
state, income distribution, and equilibrium market prices. 
Pan and Johnson (1990a) have modeled Chinese grain 
production. Their model shows that the supply function 
possesses the features ascribed by the classical firm theory. 
13 
The complication is an additional shifter-equivalent income 
variation due to the interaction between the planned and market 
sectors. They found that farm marginal decisions are affected 
by the state prices and quotas only if market price is 
uncertain. If market price is known, profit maximization rules 
much like those for producers in market economics are directly 
applicable. They also showed how the planned and market sectors 
interacte with each other and how the plan affects producer net 
income. 
Recently, Pan and Johnson (1990b) extended their analytical 
approach linking planned and market economic framework to 
evaluate policy alternatives for stimulating grain production in 
the mixed economic system. They showed thereticaly that the 
reform of Chinese grain marketing system has brought about 
positive impacts on the grain production. They concluded that, 
to ensure planning system and market system work together to 
achieve desired goals, it is important not to ignore the market 
equilibrium when formulating planning targets. 
All of these results are, however, subject to the same 
drawbacks as the aforementioned; either partial equilibrium 
approaches or without associated empirical analysis for policy 
evaluation. The general equilibrium model with commodity detail 
for the current Chinese agricultural sector has not been given 
much attention in the literature on the current mixed system 
of planning and markets. 
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In the current mixed system of planning and markets, the 
state plans and certain economic variables interact with one 
another in such a way that together they generate economic 
process that can reflect economically rational behavior. These 
behaviors and interactions among them need to be formulated into 
a system to more fully reflect the economic process. Policy 
structure issues are especially essential in these mixed models 
due to the predominant roles of government. 
It is very popular to incorporate the state plans in 
reduced form framework with the policy variables as explanatory 
variables (Carter and Zhong, 1988; Neunteufel, 1985; etc.). 
The common problems observed in this type of approach are 
incomplete specifications of policy variables, without 
explicitly specifying economic agent's objective, and not 
explicitly introducing policy variables in the objective. 
Without fully specified policy representation, the 
conclutions drawm from the results derived from reduced form 
estimation may be misleading. For instance, some studies use 
average prices, weighted averages of state prices and market 
prices, in reduced form equations to analyze producer response 
to changes in output prices and of a positive response is 
reported. When state prices are raised the average prices are 
increased. Accordingly, output will go up as the conclusions 
have indicated. However, some other results (Sicular, 1989; 
Pan and Johnson, 1990a) showed that producer marginal decisions 
are affected only by market prices if market prices are certain 
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and higher than state prices. Hence, it is important to 
complete specification of state prices and market prices in 
estimation. 
If the producer objective is not explicitly and completely 
specified or policy parameters are not fully incorporated in the 
objective, unreliable results could also be generated. This is 
because producer optimal decisions are not only based on their 
objectives but also the structure of the economy in where they 
operate. 
The structure of an economic model contains optimal 
decision rules of producers. The optimal decision rules vary 
systematically with changes in state plans. It is, therefore, 
obvious that adjustments in state plans will systematically 
alter the structure of econometric model. Thus, an econometric 
model for policy analysis must incorporate current economic 
system and the policy parameters. And evaluation of policy 
alternatives using currently developed models that include 
partial representaion of the policy and economic structure and 
an incomplete behavior hypothesis is problematic. 
1.3 Obj actives 
This study explores the microfoundations of mixed system of 
planning and markets in China and develops an agricultural 
sector model for China. This model explicitly incorporates the 
major features of the current Chinese economy and selected key 
16 
agricultural policy instruments. The farm level decisions on 
output supply and input demand are modeled in a theoretical 
framework. The structural equations at market level are then 
specified using the duality relationship between production 
function and variable profit function. The risk aversion 
is considered when the functional specification is formulated. 
The resulting expressions are estimated in a dual approach 
framework. 
The theoretical restrictions imposed by profit maximization 
and risk aversion and the technical response relations assumed 
are maintained when the structural equations are specified and 
the model is estimated. This makes the model consistent with a 
general equilibrium framework for the agriculture as a whole. 
The specific objectives of this study are; 
(1) To describe the major features of current Chinese 
agricultural economic system and the key agricultural 
policy instruments. 
(2) To build a theoretical model of the farm producer decisions 
on the supplies of outputs and demands for inputs 
incorporating current economic system and key agricultural 
policy instruments, 
(3) To specify the structural equations for output supplies and 
input demands derived in a dual approach framework, 
(4) To estimate the model maintaining all theoretical 
restrictions and examine the validity of the model, and 
(5) To evaluate the implications from the empirical findings 
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and measure the impacts of selected Chinese agricultural 
policies on the Chinese farm sector using newly developed 
model. 
1. 4  Organization of The Study 
This study is organized as follows: Chapter 1 discusses 
the background, the problem setting, and the objectives of the 
study. Chapter 2 reviews and discusses various issues involved 
in the estimation of output supply and input demand equations. 
Chapter 3 decribes the Chinese agricultural economic system and 
the essential agricultural policy structure. The implications 
of these policies and the structure for farm behavior are then 
discussed. Chapter 4 constructs a theoretical model of farm 
level decisions on output supplies and input demands in the 
current mixed system of planning and markets. Chapter 5 
outlines estimation procedure, describes the data used in the 
estimation, makes required assumptions for the analysis, and 
reviews appregation principles. Chapter 6 reports and 
interprets the empirical results and examines the validity of 
the model. Chapter 7 contains a summary of the results from the 
study, concluding remarks on the findings, and suggestions for 
further research. 
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2 MICROFOUNDATIONS OF 
ESTIMATION OF OUTPUT SUPPLY AND INPUT DEMAND 
There is strong argument that specification of output 
supply and input demand equations should be carried out on the 
basis of a rigorous foundation of the theory of the firm. The 
development in duality theory and the associated computational 
or estimation methods have made it easier and more feasible to 
estimate simultaneously both the output supply and input demand 
equations derived from the theory of firm behavior. The view 
that risk plays an important role in economic decision making 
has been widely recoganized. Much attention has been focused on 
the impacts of uncertainty upon the results of the static, 
neoclassical theory of the firm and how comparative static 
methodology is enhanced powerful duality properties. The 
natural question is whether duality can be used successfully in 
the presence of uncertainty. Other issues such as flexible 
functional form, profit function specification, and aggregation 
from firm to market levels are also involved in empirical 
implematation. The aim of this chapter is to review and discuss 
the issues involved in developing the microfoundations for 
estimation of output supply and input demand equations. 
19 
2.1 Duality: Certainty Case 
In a competitive world with regular technology, there is 
one-to-one correspondence between the production technology and 
the dual profit function (Chambers, 1988). Following Silberberg 
(1978), define the primal-dual Lagrange function as: 
(2.1) L* = F(a) - f(X, a) - AG(X, a) 
where F is the indirect objective function, f is the direct 
objective function, A is a Lagrange multiplier, G is an 
implicit constraint, X is a control vector, and a is a parameter 
vector. For the problem addressed in this study, F represents 
profit function and f profit equation for a firm, respectively. 
The profit is defined as; 
(2.2) n = PY(Z) - WZ - B 
where P and Y are the vectors of price and quantity of output, 
respectively; Z and W are the vectors of quantity and price of 
input, respectively; and B is a vector of fixed cost. 
Technology is expressed implicitly by G(Y, Z, B) =0. 
The corresponding primal-dual Lagrange function is 
(2.3) L* = n*(P, W, B) - n(Z, Y, P, W) - AG(Y, Z, B). 
First order conditions are 
(2.4) - XGjj = 0, 
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(2.5) 3n* / da - dU. / da = 0, 
(2.6) G(X, B) = 0. 
where 11^  and are vectors of derivatives with respect to the 
control vector X=(Z) and a represents the parameter set (P, W, 
B). It is worth noting that, by Samuelson's and Silberberg's 
interpretation, at the optimal value X* the rate of change of 
profit with X* adjusting to changing a is equal to the rate of 
change of profit with respect to a when profit is evaluated at 
X* (treating X fixed at X*). 
Solving (2.4) for optimal output yields Y as a function of 
P and W: 
(2.7) Y* = Y(P, W), 
which is the firm's supply function. Substituting (2.7) into 
(2.2) gives the profit function: 
(2.8) n* = PY(P, W) - WZ(P, W) - B = n(P, W, B), 
which is the same as the first term in Equation (2.2). 
The profit function possesses the following properties (Lau 
and Potopolous, 1972; Lau, 1978; Varian, 1984; Chambers, 1988): 
(1) It is a non-negative real valued function for all positive 
prices. (2) It is homogeneous of degree one in all prices. (3) 
It is convex and continuous in P and W for every fixed B. (4) 
It is nondecreasing in output prices and nonincreasing in 
input prices. And (5) it is differentiable only if there exists 
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a unique profit maximizing supply and input demand 
If the function is differentiable then: 
(2.9) dïï. / dVl = Z*, 
(2.10) an /  gp = Y*. 
This property is referred to as Hotelling's lemma. 
Two additional properties can be derived from (3) and (5). 
First, the matrix of second order derivatives of !!(.) with 
respect P and W is positive semidefinite. 
Second, by Young's theorem, cross partial derivatives must be 
equal: 
a^ n/ôPj^ ôPj = 3Yj^ /3Pj = 3Yj/3P£ = 8^ n/5Pj3P£ 
(2.12) -a^ n/aw^ awj = az^ /awj = azj/aw^  = aZn/awjawi 
9^ n/3Pj^ 0Wj = 6Yj^ /3Wj = 6Zj/6Pi = 0^ n/0WjôPj^ . 
Equation (2.12) is generally referred to as the symmetric 
restriction. These imply that the matrix of H is symmetric. 
The production technology can be examined directly using 
the primal approach or indirectly in a dual framework. The 
a^ n/apj^ apj a^ n/apjaw^  ' 
(2.11) H = 
_ a^ n/aw^ aPj a^ n/aw^ a^wj 
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output supply and input demand relationships derived by the two 
approaches are identical. 
The principal advantage of using the dual approach in the 
specification of system of supply and demand equations that is 
consistent with maximization behavior that allows the derivation 
of forms for supply and demand equations as the derivatives of 
a function rather than as the solution to a constrained 
maximization problem. Thus, the problem of production 
technologies giving rise to nonclosed-form solutions for demand 
equations is eliminated (Hallam et al., 1982). 
The crux of this approach is that it is no more arbitrary 
to start the analysis by choosing a specification for a profit 
function than it is to choose a specification for a production 
function. Thus, specifying an arbitrary functional form for the 
indirect criterion function that satisfies the necessary 
regularity conditions guarantees that the resulting decision 
functions are derivable as the result of a maximization process 
for some well-behaved technology. Since these functions can be 
made quite flexible while allowing analytic derivation of 
implied supply and demand specification, fewer restrictions must 
be imposed on the underlying technology and preferences than in 
the primal approach (Hallam et al., 1982). 
Furthermore, the coefficients in the system of supply and 
demand estimated in a dual framework, can be substituted 
directly back to profit function to analyze welfare levels under 
different prices or policy scenarios (Just et al., 1983). 
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Finally, it is easier to estimate output supply and input 
demand relationships in the dual framework, the dual approach 
does not require output specific input usage (Shumway, 1983; 
Lopez, 1982). Aggregate input use is sufficient for applying 
the dual approach while output specific input use is necessary 
in estimation in primal formulation. This has been a 
significant factor in the choice of which approach to be used, 
for in many cases, the data on output specific use are not 
available at market level. 
2.2 Duality: Uncertainty case 
There is growing evidence that attitudes towards risk play 
an important role in economic decision making. Much effort has 
been made to examine how the firm theory performs when 
uncertainty is incorporated. Using the expected utility 
maximization farmework, McCall (1967) showed that output under 
uncertainty is less than, equal to, or higher than output under 
certainty for the risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-loving 
firm, respectively; since the optimal output is characterized by 
marginal cost being less than, equal to, or higher than the 
expected price for the risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-
loving firm, respectively. 
By examining the comparative statics of the firm under 
uncertainty, Sandmo (1971) found that simply assuming the 
existence of risk aversion is a very weak restriction on the 
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firm's attitudes to risk. Sandmo (1971) and Batra and Ullah 
(1974) have shown that nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is 
a sufficient condition for an upward sloping supply curve. 
Unlike the results derived from the situation of certainty, 
Sandmo also verified that fixed inputs do matter in the sense 
that once a strictly positive output level has been chosen, this 
output is affected by a change in fixed input. Furthermore, 
competitive equilibrium under price uncertainty and risk 
aversion requires the existence of positive profits in order to 
choose a positive output level. 
Ishii (1977) extended the Sandmo result to show that 
nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is a sufficient condition 
for output to decrease in response to an increase in price 
uncertainty, as defined by a mean preserving spread in the 
distribution of price. 
The effects of output price uncertainty on factor demands 
have been investigated by Batra and Ullah (1974) who showed that 
under uncertainty the firm will choose input levels which 
minimize the cost of producing a given level of output. Based 
on this finding, along with Sandmo's conclusion that the 
presence of uncertainty reduces output, Hartman (1975) showed 
that the impacts of price uncertainty on factor demands depend 
on how the reduced level of output affects the cost minimizing 
level on inputs. The presence of uncertainty will reduce factor 
demands, except for inferior factors, for a risk averse firm. 
If the firm is risk neutral, the existing uncertainty has no 
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effect on output supply and input demand. Hartman (1976) also 
invested the case where capital is a quasi-fixed factor, which 
means that capital input must be chosen ex ante—before the 
output price is observed. The labor input can, however, be 
adjusted ex post. Contrary to the case where all input are 
chosen ex ante, uncertainty plays an important role in 
determination of optimal input levels for a risk neutral firm. 
Recently, much attention has been concentrated on how the 
comparative static methodology applies the powerful duality 
properties and whether duality approach can be used in the 
presence of uncertainty. 
Assume that output price is randomly distributed as 
(2.13) Pi = Pi + ei, E(Pi) = Pi-
For the problem considered, let F and f in Equation (2.1) refer 
to the indirect and direct expected utility function of profit 
for a firm, respectively. The corresponding primal-dual 
Lagrange function is 
(2.14) L* = E(U*[n*(M,W,B)]} - E{U[n(Y,Z,M,W)]} - XG(Y,Z,B) 
Where M denotes relevant moments of the distribution of P. 
First order conditions are: 
(2.15) E[U' (mn^ ] - AGjj = 0, 
(2.16) aE[u*(n)] / da ' aE[u(n)] / aa = o. 
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(2.17) G(X, B) = 0 
where U' (H) = dU/dll and a represents the parameter set (M, W, 
B). All other notation is the same as defined for Equation 
(2.1). Equation (2.16) states that at the optimal value X*, the 
rate of change of expected utility with X* adjusting a is equal 
to the rate of change of expected utility with respect to a when 
expected utility is evaluated at X* (treating X fixed at X*). 
Previous studies have shown (Sandmo, 1971; Aradhyula, 1988) 
that when prices are not known ex ante, the risk neutral 
producer behaves as if prices are known with certainty and equal 
to the expected value. Hence, a profit function for the 
certainty case is equivalent to the expected profit function for 
a risk neutral producer. In this case, conditions in (2.15) and 
(2.16) become 
(2.18) ECn*] - XG^  = 0, 
(2.19) 8E[n*] / da - 8E[n] / da = 0, 
where * indicates optimal quantities. From Equations (2.19), 
(2.2), and ( 2.13), the results of McFadden are derived: 
(2.20) aE[n*] / aw^  = - z^ *, 
(2.21) aE[n*] / aPj = Yj*. 
When risk aversion is assumed for a firm, these primal-dual 
relations do not necessarily exist. Equation (2.15) leads to 
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Utility maximizing input demands; 
(2.22) Zi* = f(P, W, a, a) 
and output supplies: 
(2.23) Yi* = f(P, W, a, a) 
where a is a vector of parameters characterizing the stochastic 
properties of prices other than their means such that dej^ /dPj^  = 
0 for i = 1, ..., n and Ge^ /Gw^  = 0. 
Substituting Z* and Y* into the direct utility function 
gives the indirect utility function which specifies maximum 
expected utility as a function of the stochastic of prices; 
(2.24) E[V] =E(U*[X*(a), a]}, 
which is the indirect objective function, equivalent to F(a) in 
Equation (2.1). The concavity of direct utility function in X 
do dot necessarily imply convexity of the indirect utility 
function because is nonzero, where = d^U*/dada. 
Application of the envelope theorem implies 
(2.25) 8E{U*(n)] / = - Zi*E[U'(n)], 
(2.26) aE[u*(n)] / apj = Yj*E[u'(n)]. 
Apparently, in the case of uncertain prices, the 
derivatives of the expected utility function no longer 
explicitly give factor demands or output supplies. The effects 
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on the expected utility of profit function of a change in the 
mean of the price distribution is equal to the usual supply 
function or input demand function weighted by the expected 
marginal utility of profit (Roger and Lusky, 1977). 
Furthermore, because (2.25) and (2.26) are not generally 
separable in X, meaningfull comparative static results are not 
as easily derived as under certainty. 
Differentiation of (2.24) with respect to Oj gives the 
envelope result: 
(2.27) E[V]Qj = aE[V] / ôttj = aE[U*] / ôoj X*. 
Further diferentiating equation (2.27) with respect to aj^  yields 
N 
(2.28) E[V]ajak = s (3X*i / Ba^ ) + X*. 
i—1 
These results can be expressed compactly in matrix form as, 
(2.29) E[V]aa = ECU*]*** (dX* / da) + ECU*]** X*. 
Further derivation of an explicit representation of primal-
dual relationships in terms of Hessian matrix can show the 
curvature of E[V]. Since optimal X* is derived from ôE[U*]/3Xj^  
= 0, i=l,...,n, comparative static analysis of the above 
equation gives in matrix form; 
(2.30) ax* / 6a = - E[U*]xx-lE[U*]x*. 
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Substituting Equation (2.30) into (2.29) implies (dropping 
the asterisk on X for convenience); 
(2.31) E[V]oo = - E[U*]xaE[U*]xx"^ E[U*]xa + E[U*]^  ^
where all functions are evaluated at X*. The left-hand side of 
Equation (2.31) is the Hessian of the indirect utility function. 
Moving last term on the right-hand side of the equation yields 
(2.32) E[V]ao - E[U*]„„ = - E[U*]j^ E^[U*]3,J,-1E[U*] 
Since E[U*]xx is negative definite by assumption of risk 
aversion, so is Thus, E[V]^ j^  - E[U*]j^  ^is positive 
semidefinite and must be positive semidefinite if EEU*]^  ^is of 
rank n because the left-hand side of Equation (2.32) is of full 
rank in this case. 
Consider a special case of Equation (2.32) associated with 
certainty. The strict concavity of U* in X is equivalent to 
convexity of V in normalized prices. When risk and risk 
aversion are introduced into the question, the concavity of 
E[U*] in X does not necessarily imply convexity of E[V] in 
normalized prices. However, under constant risk aversion, 
Hallam et al. (1982) showed that concavity of E[U*] in X is 
equivalent to convexity of E[V] in normalized prices since 
E[U*]jjct = 0 in this case. 
By explorating into the implications of convexity of L* as 
implied by maximization of expected utility, Pope (1980) showed 
that with single product. 
30 
(2.33) Lpp* = S (aE[U'(n)Y*] /  dZ^) * (32^ /  8P) > 0. 
1=1 
This result is derivable in the general M input model given 
above as derived by direct differetiation of first order 
conditions by Sandmo. Thus, assuming nonincreasing absolute 
risk aversion, it is found that dY*/d'9>0 and the supply curve is 
upward sloping. 
Pope also showed that 
* M 
(2.34) Iviwi = -.Z (8{ZiE[U' (n)])  /  aZj) * (8Zj /  aWi) > O. 
j-1 
This nonnegative relation is obtained if the conditions of 
production concavity (Gii(o) and complementarity (Gj^ j)O) also 
hold under risk aversion such that aZj^ */8W£<0 and Y*/aWi<0. 
The factor demand curves are then downward sloping. 
Given nonincreasing risk aversion, Pope derived three 
sufficient conditions for symmetry of factor demand equations as 
the results under certainty: 
[1] E[U"(n)(e - T)] = 0 or 
[2] (aY*/awj) / (aY*/awi) = Zj* / z^ * or 
[3] fgi = aE[u(n)] / aw^  = z^  for aii i. 
where T = Cov[U'(H), P]. [1] describes the risk neutral or 
constant risk averse case and [3] the separability condition. 
31 
Risk neutrality implies conditions [1] and [3]. When risk 
preferences are nonlinear, there is no reason a priori to expect 
that the symmetry of factor demands, condition [2] will hold, it 
is so even under certainty. It follows immediatly that the 
symmetry condition hold only under constant risk aversion when 
risk preference is nonlinear. Condition [3] provides insight 
for the development of models guaranteeing the symmetry 
condition when risk aversion prevails. 
Pope also showed that the symmetry for -3z j^ */3P=9Y*/3Wj^  is 
held only if conditions [1], [3], and 
[4] (dY*/dV^ ) / (aY*/6P) = - Zi* / Y*. 
When multiproduct case is considered, the term is 
ubiquitous in determination of comparative static results. 
However, by delinearing further restrictions on preferences, 
some usefull results can be obtained. 
From Silberberg's theorem of the maximization hypothesis, 
a^iaj~^ ajai corollary, dX^ /da^ =dX^ /da^  if objective function 
is additively separable in functions of the form a^ ). 
Pope established following corollary: if fû!j^ =faj^ (Xj^ , a) for all 
i, then symmetry is preserved if faj^ Xj^ =YfttjXj, where 
equals 1 or -1. 
Given these conditions and results, one can define a class 
of utility functions which satisfy some or all of the 
assumptions and conditions needed to develop restrictions that 
are readily amenable to econometric analysis. This class is the 
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set of expected utility functions, common in empirical work, of 
the form 
(2.35) E[U(n)]  = n + *(Y, Y) 
where £(11) = n and y is defined as moments of P about P of order 
2 and greater. If a class of utility functions exhibit the form 
in (2.35), the following theorem and corollary were stated and 
proved. 
Consider a utility function of profits and the expected 
utility function is of form 
(2.36) E[U(II)] = E[n + (E-n) + ... + «^ (11-1)^  
+ ... + Oip (n-n) "^ 3 
then, in case of uncertain output price, (2.36) can be written 
T 
(2.37) E[U(n)]  = n + S OtOt, 
t=2 
where is the t-th central moment of H. Let , 
where Yt represents a vector of all relevant moments of price 
of order 2 and greater about mean. Equation (2.37) can be 
rewritten as 
T 
(2.38) E[U(n)]  = n + s at*t(Yt'  
t=2 
= n + *(Y, Y) ,  
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where i|i does not depend on P. By Pope's corollary, following 
relations can be derived; 
(2.39) aE[U(n)]  / = - Z^ * for all i, and 
(2.40) aZi* / aWj = aZj* / aw^  for all i and j. 
It is of interest to examine comparative static changes in 
particular moments of y leaving others unchanged. Pope showed 
change in P holding other moments unchanged yields 
(2.41) aE[u(n)] / ap^  = 
and according to Pope's corollary all output symmetries and 
output supply and (negative) input demand symmetries are 
preserved when diff/ dP=0 is assumed. That is 
(2.42) a?!* / aPj = aYj* / ap^  for all i and j, and 
(2.43) dYy* / awjj = -azjj* / aPj^  for all k and h. 
When input prices are subject to uncertainty, the same 
logic is applicable and the comparative static results are 
derivable. 
An apparent corollary is that the utility function need not 
be of the form in (2.36). That is, monotonically increasing 
transformations of (2.35) imply identical results. For example, 
the constant absolute risk aversion utility function of profits 
is negative exponential; 
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(2.44) UfE) = - be-BG 
where II is profit which is assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean II and variance a^ , b is positive, and R is the measure 
of absolute risk aversion. Freund (1956) has shown that the 
producer's objective is to maximize 
(2.45) n + agC^ , ag < 0. 
The theorem and corollary indicated in (2.39), (2.40), (2.41) 
(2.42), and (2.43) follow. The constant absolute risk aversion 
utility function has proved popular in pratical examples. 
2.3 Producer Risk Preference 
The microfoundations developed in 2.1 through 2.2 need to 
be specialized for empirical implementation for the present 
study. In particular, it is necessary to specify the nature of 
producer risk preferences. 
To specify the supply and input demand functions, it is 
necessary to consider an explicit representation of producer 
risk preferences. The available methods have include (1) 
specifying a direct functional form of the utility function, 
(2) approximating the risk premium with a finite number of 
terms, and (3) using an indirect specification of the expected 
utility function. For detailed dicussion see Hallam et al. 
Previous studies have shown (Sandmo, 1971; Aradhyula, 1988) 
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that when prices are not known ex ante, the risk neutral 
producers behave as if prices are known with certainty and equal 
to the expected values. Thus, a profit function for a certainty 
case is equivalent to the expected profit function for a risk 
neutral producer. Many analyses suggest that, however, 
producers are not risk neutral but risk averse and maximize the 
expected utility of profits rather than simply profits (Young et 
al., 1979). 
The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, denoted 
by Rj^ (n) , is known as; 
(2.46) R^ (n) = - u"(n)/u'(n) 
where the terms in the parentheses are the outcomes of concern 
to the individual in terms of one continuous variable, here is 
the profits of producers. The producer displays risk aversion, 
neutrality, or loving as R^ (n) greater than, equal to, or less 
than 0. If n changes Rj^ (n) may be increased, constant, or 
decreased. Accordingly, the producer is increasing, constant, 
or decreasing absolute risk averse, respectively. 
2.4 Profit Function 
Making assumptions on the structure of technology is the 
first step in an econometric analysis. For smooth technologies, 
the empirical measurement of the economically relevant 
information, or generality in representing technology includes 
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the value of the function, the gradient of the function, and the 
Hessian. For any primal or dual technology with n netputs 
(outputs and negative inputs), therefore, there are 
0.5(n+l)(n+2) economically relevant effects. A functional form 
is flexible if it does not impose a priori values to any of 
these 0.5(n+l)(n+2) coefficients. These effects are determined 
by the data. Thus, it is not flexible functional form unless 
the functional form with n variables has at least 0.5(n+l)(n+2) 
parameters. However, flexible functional forms nevertheless 
impose some a priori restrictions, and not all flexible 
functional forms are equally suitable as dual representation of 
technology (Blackorby et al., 1977; Lopez, 1985). 
The flexible functional forms have included generalized 
Leontief (Diewert, 1971), the translog (Christensen et al., 
1973), normalized quadratic (Lau, 1978), generalized McFadden 
(Diewert and Wales, 1987), miniflex Laurent (Barnett, 1983), and 
Fourier (Gallant, 1981, 1982, 1984). 
An algebraic functional form for a profit function n(P,W,a) 
is of flexible functional form if at any given set of non-
negative output and input prices (P and W), the parameter vector 
a can be chosen so that the profit function, the implied output 
supply and input demand functions, as well as their own and 
cross price elastisities can be assumed any arbitrary values at 
the given set of prices subject only to the theoretical 
consistency (Chambers, 1988). The present study uses a 
normalized quadratic variable profit function to represent the 
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optimizing benavior of farm producers (Lau, 1976). 
The normalized quadratic functional form represents a 
second order Taylor series approximation to the unknown profit 
function. Consider an agricultural producer with n outputs, m 
inputs (where n + m = q), and K fixed inputs or exogenous 
variables, market-level normalized (normalized by EPg) quadratic 
profit function is 
q-1 q-1 q-1 K 
(2.47) n (P,B) = ttf, + S a.EP. + S S b^ E^P.EF^  + S 0^ 8% 
i=l i=l j=l ^   ^ k=l 
K K q-1 K 
+ S Z difi Bi-i + S S e^i-EP^Bi. 
k=l 1=1 i=l k=l 1% 1 * 
where H* is profit divided by the price of qth netput (netput 
including both output and input), EP^  is expected price of ith 
netput and P represents prices of both outputs and inputs, Bj^  
is quantity of kth fixed input or exogenous variable, and ûq, 
®i' ^ ij' °k' ^ kl ®ik parameters to be estimated. 
By Retelling's lemma, the first derivatives of a normalized 
profit function with respect to normalized output prices and 
normalized input prices are the output supply and (negative) 
variable input demand equations. And these equations derived 
from the normalized quadratic profit function are linear in 
normalized output and variable input prices and fixed input 
quantities or exogenous variables. The numeraire netput is then 
calculated conditional on above estimations. These equations 
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are given by 
q-1 K 
(2.4S) Yi = «1 + S bijEPj + S 1=1,2 ,. « «, n 
q-1 K 
i=l,2 f • m • f III"" 1 
q-1 q-1 
0.5 S 
K K K 
(2.50) -Xn = «o 
i=l j: 
Because Bj represents an aggregate input level, consistent 
This implies that 3^ n*(P,B)/3Bj^ 3B2=d]^ i=0, a priori in the 
estimation. Equations (2.48), (2.49), and (2.50) are the 
complete system of equations to be estimated simultaneously in 
this study. 
The linear output supply and input demand equations make it 
convenient in the estimation. This is one of the advantages of 
normalized quadratic profit function over other flexible 
functional forms. Furthermore, the matrix of second derivatives 
of a normalized quadratic profit function with respect to 
normalized prices is constant. This constant matrix allows us 
to check the convexity of profit function in prices by simply 
evaluation if the matrix is positive semi-definite. And this 
constant matrix implies that local convexity is also global 
convexity. 
aggregation across firms requires that n*(P,B) be affine in B 
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2.5 Aggregation 
The preceding discussion on expected utility function, 
profit function, and the implied output supply and input demand 
equations are based on firm theory. However, firm level data 
are not always available, more offen the cross sectional or time 
series data at industry or national level are handy. 
Accordingly, industry functions, rather than firm-level 
functions, are estimated. As a result, firm level functions 
must be translated into market-level functions. This is refered 
in economics to "aggregation problem." 
The aggregation problem involvs what functional forms for 
market-level functions are consistent with firm-level theory and 
what restrictions to be imposed on firm-level functions to 
ensure they are compatible with the rules of aggrgation. 
Consider there are N firms. When all firms face the same 
output and input prices and no fixed variables are involved, 
then the aggregation problem become relative simple because 
there is no restriction to be imposed on either firm-level of 
market-level functions. Following equations explan the 
aggregation rule from firm-level to market-level. 
N 
(2.51) 7r(P,W) = S ni(P,W) 
i=l 
Adopting Hotelling's lemma one derive 
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N N 
(2.52) 8n(P,W)/8P4 = S n.(P,W)/aP^  = S Y^ .(P,W) = (P,W), and 
J i=l J i=l J 
N N 
(2.53) a7r(P,W)/8Wjj = Z^ ni(P,W)/8Wh = Z^ -Zhi(P,W) = -Zh(P,W). 
These aggregation rules are often used in empirical studies. 
However, producer specific variables, for example, fixed inputs, 
specific prices, and specific policies imposed by government, 
may present. The presence of producer specific variables impose 
somse restrictions on the functional forms of both aggregate and 
firm-level profit functions. For detaied discussion see Gorman 
1968, Blackorby and Schworm 1982, Chambers 1988, and Pope and 
Chambers 1988. 
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3 CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND IMPLICATIONS 
To better incorporate the major features of the current 
Chinese agricultural economic system and the key agricultural 
policy instruments in building the model, this chapter would 
describe the Chinese agricultural economic system and essential 
agricultural policy structure. Then, the implications of these 
system and policy structure are discussed. 
3.1 Agricultural Economic System 
3.1.1 System prior to 1978 
The rural collectivization characterized by Mutual Aid 
Teams and later on. Cooperatives were initiated soon after the 
three year recovery period following the foundation of the 
People's Republic of China in 1949. 
Six years later, the system of the Rural People's Commune 
embodying both government administration and economic management 
was established in 1958. Experienced several changes over time, 
the "three-level ownership (the people's commune, the production 
brigade, and the production team) with the production team as 
the basic unit" ended up to be the major property of the commune 
system. According to the Chinese official statistics(Chinese 
statistical bureau, 1981), an average commune in 1978 had 13 
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production brigades, 91 production teams, 3,287 households, 
15,218 persons. 
As the basic production and accounting unit, the production 
teams managed land and other means of agricultural production, 
organized farm production activities, quantified and distributed 
incomes. However, all decisions, including the area and 
varieties of crops, dates of plowing, sowing, transplanting, 
applying fertilizers and insecticides, and harvesting, the 
techniques, etc., were made from higher level authorities. Some 
were made by governments at the county or higher level and 
transmitted by the commune or production brigade. Some were 
made by the commune or brigade themselves according to 
government policies. The commune and county governments were , 
however, not free in transmitting and making decisions. They 
had to follow orders from higher levels of governments (Carter 
and Zhong, 1988). 
Farmers working under the supervision of a team leader were 
credited with work points for a day's work that they had done. 
At the end of a year, net team income was first distributed 
among team members according to basic needs, then the rest was 
distributed according to the work points that each member had 
accumulated during the year (Lin, 1988). 
Agricultural products were marketed under three categories 
according to the nature of the products and the extent of 
importance to the economy. The products in the first category 
included grain, cotton, velvet, and vegetable oil crops and were 
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classified as "state monopoly purchasing and marketing" goods. 
The government assinged a procurement quota to each group 
producers: Communes, brigades or teams, specifying how much 
must be sold to the state at what prices. The producers had an 
obligation to fulfill the quota requirements unless a serious 
disaster occurred. The government offered an above-quota price, 
for extra delivery. In the case of grain, this price was 30 
percent higher than the quota price (Carter and Zhong, 1988). 
The government also set a total grain output target based on 
historical production figures. Both the procurement quota and 
output target were normally fixed for a three or five year 
period. If the actual output exceeded substantially.the target, 
30 percent of the above-target output was regulated to be sold 
to the state at the above-quota price. During the 1970s, the 
additional sale were purchased at a "negotiated price", which 
was also set by the government. It was 20 percent higher than 
the above-quota price (Carter and Zhong, 1988). In the case of 
cotton, all output must be sold to the state except a small 
amount left for the farmer's own use. This amount was also set 
by the government (Walker, 1984). 
The second category comprised of over 70 farm and sideline 
products such as pork, beef, mutton, eggs, and tea (Duan, 1987). 
The products under this category were called "fixed quota 
purchasing" goods. The compulsory purchasing quotas and prices 
for these products were also set by the government. The 
remaining outputs were permitted to be sold in local markets. 
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The rest of the agricultural products belonged to the 
third category. There were no compulsory quotas or prices 
imposed on these products. Since long distance transportation 
and external marketing were prohibited, the state commerce 
agency was the main or even the sole buyer of products in both 
the second and the third categories. The state prices were thus 
dominant in the local markets. 
The transactions in factor markets, such as land market, 
labor market, and private credit market, were all prohibited. 
3.1.2 System between 1978-1984 
In late 1978 when' China started an agricultural reform, 
various production responsibility systems were introduced 
modifying the commune system. The production target was not 
compulsory any more. Production teams and individual farmers 
could make decisions regarding their own production measures. 
Production teams were allowed to allocate resources to 
diversified activities and to internally adopt various forms 
of responsibility systems as long as they could fulfill the 
quota and above-quota purchases and meet the social welfare 
requirements imposed by the commune and brigade. In the 
meantime, the prices of 18 major farm products increased by 24.8 
percent on average, which resulted in a 22.1 percent increase in 
the agricultural price index. The grain quota price, among 
others, was raised by 20 percent on average. The former above-
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quota purchase and negotiated purchase was combined into new 
category which was also referred to as negotiated purchase. And 
the negotiated prices was set at 50 percent over the new quota 
price (Carter and Zhong, 1988). 
By 1983, the "full responsibility system" turned out to 
be the most appropriate one. Under this system, a farm 
household was allocated a parcel of collective land to farm, a 
herd of livestock to raise, or a piece of machinery to provide 
service for other members in the team. In return, the household 
was obligated to fulfill the state quotas and meet the 
collective welfare requirements. The surplus was then within 
the farmer's discretion. They could use the surplus for their 
own consumption or dispose of in local markets or state 
negotiated purchases. 
The transactions of factors, such as hiring labor, 
subleasing land, private lending money at high interest, were 
still explicitly forbidden in this period. 
3.1.3 Svstem after 1984 
Begining in 1985, the state monopoly for purchasing and 
marketing of major farm products except for individual 
varieties, such as tobacco, was abolished. A system of 
purchasing under contracts and on the free markets for grain and 
cotton was introduced. Before the sowing season, the state and 
farmers signed purchase contracts specifying the quantity and 
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price of grain or cotton to be delivered to the state. Both the 
quantity and price are set by the state with the price somewhat 
lower than that in the free markets (An, 1989). The new grain 
price equates the weighted quota and above-quota prices, with 
the former accounting for 30 percent and the latter 70 percent 
(Carter and Zhong, 1988). As for the price of cotton, 30 
percent is purchased in north China at the state purchase price 
and the rest can be sold at the above-quota price. In the 
south, 60 percent of cotton is bought at the state price and 40 
percent at the above-quota purchase price (Duan, 1987). 
All products not purchased under the contract were disposed 
of in free markets. The state could buy this surplus in the 
free markets at the market prices. If the market prices are 
lower than the state purchase price, the state has an obligation 
to buy the entire quantity at state prices (Cheng, 1985). Table 
3.1 describes the data on total grain production and different 
grain marketing channels. 
The fixed quota purchase system for pigs, aquatic products, 
beef, mutton, poultry, eggs, vegetable and other non-staple 
foods was also abolished. Selling prices are decontrolled, free 
markets are opened and prices are determined by supply and 
demand. 
The system of state monopoly for purchasing timber was 
replaced by the system of state negotiated purchase at the 
negotiated price. The system of state monopoly for purchasing 
Chinese medical herbs was also removed and free purchase and 
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Table 3.1. Grain production and marketing channels^  
Year 
Grain^  
Production 
Total® 
Sale 
Average® 
Price 
Negotiated^  
Sale 
Negotiated^  
Price 
1978 304.765 50.73 0.263 1.33 0.520 
1979 332.115 60.10 0.331 4.77 0.518 
1980 320.555 61.29 0.361 8.40 0.510 
1981 325.020 68.46 0.382 9.77 0.520 
1982 354.500 78.06 0.392 14.64 0.501 
1983 387.275 102.49 0.393 16.36 0.509 
1984 407.305 117.25 0.395 19.83 0.561 
1985 379.108 107.63 0.416 22.86 0.511 
1986 391.512 115.16 0.466 25.99 0.520 
1987 402.977 120.92 0.509 29.02 0.620 
1988 394.081 119.95 0.564 32.05 0.707 
Q^uantities in million tons and prices in Yuan/kg. 
R^aw grain and collected from Statistical Yearbook of 
China, 1988 and 1989. 
C^ollected from China Trade and Price Statistics, 1988. 
*^ Collected from China Trade and Price Statistics, 1952-
1983. The quantities from 1984 to 1988 are estimated by 
regression and the prices for years 1984 to 1988 are set equal 
to market prices. 
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Table 3.1. (continued) 
Quota® Quota^  Market# Market# 
Year Sale Sale Sale Price 
1978 48.20 0.256 1.20 0.692 
1979 53.33 0.300 2.00 0.625 
1980 49.79 0.304 3.10 0.581 
1981 55.09 0.316 3.60 0.581 
1982 59.17 0.358 4.25 0.581 
1983 81.63 0.329 4.50 0.587 
1984 92.67 0.319 4.75 0.561 
1985 79.27 0.388 5.50 0.511 
1986 82.87 0.454 6.30 0.520 
1987 85.29 0.506 6.61 0.620 
1988 81.18 0.580 6.72 0.707 
C^alculated by the formula; 
Quota Sale = Total Sale - Negotiated Sale - Market Sale. 
fPrices for year from 1978 to 1984 are collected from 
China Trade and Price Statistics, 1988. Prices of 1985 to 1988 
are calculated by the formula; 
Quota Price = (Total Sale * Average Price - Negotiated Sale * 
Negotiated Price - Market Sale * Market Price) / Quota Sale. 
C^ollected from various issues of Statistical Yearbook of 
China. 
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marketing become legal except for those products under strict 
control for protecting natural resources. The state monopoly 
in trade tobacco are kept in effect. Tobacco is treated 
differently according different varieties. A mandatory purchase 
plan is drawn up by the state and transactions in tobacco is 
handled by designated state commercial companies, but the 
purchase price has been raised somewhat. 
All other farm products are no longer subject to state 
monopolies. The farmers can sell their products freely and all 
commercial agencies are allowed to buy farm products directly 
from farmers. The state is not the sole buyer and seller of 
farm products any more. 
To promote grain production, as sufficient grain supply has 
been the major concern of the policy makers, the state uses 
input subsidies. These have included preferential supplies of 
chemical fertilizers, improved seed varieties, and other means 
of production at lower prices. State loans at low interest rate 
are also available for the grain producers. 
Factor transactions, namely land, labor, and private 
credit, were legalized but in limited extent and restrict forms. 
Land can not be bought or sold as before. Land transactions are 
in fact to shift the right to use the land and take place in two 
forms. The first form is the one without compensation. In this 
case, farmers can either give their land back to collective 
(former production team which is altered to village) or give it 
to relatives or friends. Households still hold their claim over 
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the right to use the land. This means that they can take land 
back whenever they desire. The transactions can be compensated 
if the land is leased out. Rent or sharecropping are the two 
common ways to be compensated. 
Labor transactions are also legal now. But the up limit to 
hire labor is set at eight workers. As other output and factor 
markets are open, credit with high interest rate is no longer 
prohibited (Chen, 1987). 
3.2 Economic Implications 
As the household responsibility system restored the 
individul household as the basic unit of production and 
accounting and the new system brings the decision making power 
back to the farmers, the farmers are now responsible for profits 
and losses from their own performance. Maximum attainable 
profits become farmers' objectives. 
In the environment of mixed system of planning and markets, 
the farmers must behave in accordance with the rules of the 
markets because the marginal decisions involve whether to 
purchase or sell on the markets upon the relative prices on the 
markets given the government intervention. 
Although the state prices and quotas do not affect producer 
marginal decisions, they do matter in determining producer 
maximum attainable profits. Because producer profits will turn 
to zero in a competitive and certainty world, the state prices 
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and quotas and production expenditures together determine if the 
producers desire to produce more than the quotas. Thus, state 
prices and quotas do have indirect impacts on production. 
Furthermore, if producers are subject to uncertainty, the state 
prices and quotas, in addition to the market prices, do have 
effects on marginal decision making. Since the real world is, 
more or less, characterized by uncertainty either in production 
or price, especially the agricultural production is sub]ect to 
uncertain factors such as weather, the state prices and quotas 
do influence agricultural production. 
Transactions in land, labor, and credit, even if it is 
limited somewhat, give rise to allocate resources efficiently. 
If the transactions are costless, certain, unconstrained, and 
enforceable, then marginal products will be brought into 
equality by market transactions. Production specialization and 
diversification are encouraged in line with local comparative 
advantages. The economy as a whole is thus running more 
efficiently. 
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4 THEORETICAL SUPPLY MODEL 
This chapter will develop a theoretical supply side model 
incorporating the current Chinese economic system and major 
agricultural policy instruments. The chapter begins with the 
description of a theoretical profit function for the Chinese 
farmers. The producer risk preferences are then introduced into 
the model. Finally, the implied output supply and input demanad 
equations are derived and discussed. 
4.1 Decision Rules Under Certainty 
4.1.1 A primal approach 
Consider a price-taking farm producing n outputs with m 
inputs and k fixed inputs and exogenous variables. The 
production function in implicit form is given by 
(4.1) F(yj^ ,...,yj^ ,X]^ ,...,Xjjj) — 0. 
The implicit production function is assumed to have 
continuous first and second order partial derivatives that are 
different from zero for all its nontrivial solutions. It is 
assumed that (4.1) is an increasing function of the y's and a 
decreasing function of the x's. Finally, it is assumed that 
(4.1) is regular strictly quasi-convex over a relevant domain. 
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Under the current mixed system of planning and markets, the 
Chinese farmers are presumed to maximize profit 
(4.2) n = P'*Yf + Pg'*Yg - W'*X 
where n is profit; P and Pg are nxl vectors of market prices and 
state prices of outputs, respectively; W is a mxl vector of 
variable input prices; Yj and Yg are nxl vectors of outputs sold 
in free markets and to the state, respectively; and X is a mxl 
vector of variable inputs. The producer maximization of profit 
is subject to its technology characterized by the implicit 
production function, output quotas Yg, sold to the state at the 
state prices, and input constraints. 
Since Yg + Yf = Y, where Y is a nxl vector of total output, 
let assume that Y^  > 0, Yg = Yg, and inputs are not binding. 
Substituting these assumptions into Equation (4.2), the profit 
can be rewritten as: 
(4.3) n = P'*Y - (P - Pg)'*Yg - W'*X. 
The question is what is (P - Pg)*Yg? In Figure 4.1, S 
represents the supply curve of output and D the demand curve of 
the output. P and Y are the observed market equilibrium price 
and quantity. In line with the state price Pg producers are 
required to supply Yg, and Yg = Y - Yg, the output sold in the 
free markets. The shaded area, (P - Pg)*Yg is thus the change 
in producer surplus due to mandatory selling Yg to the state at 
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Ps 
Y 
Figure 4.1. Producer equivalent income variation 
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price Pg, lower than the market price P. To better interpret 
this model, we could define (P - Pg)*Yg as equivalent income 
variation for output Y denoted by EIV. As long as the supply 
curve is observable, EIV is measurable. The level of EIV is 
negatively related to maximum attainable producer profits. 
Thus, EIV works like producer tax dispensing with producer 
equivalent income variation. Based on the discussion. Equation 
(4.3) can be modified as: 
(4.4) n = P'*Y - W'X - EIV, 
and apart from including the surplus measure, is of standard 
form. 
The Lagrange function for this problem is given by 
(4.5) L = P'*Y - W'*X - EIV' + AF(yi,...,yn,Xi,...,Xm). 
Take the first order partial derivatives and set each of them 
equal to zero: 
dli / = Pi + = 0 i = l,...,n 
(4.6) 3l / 3xj = - Wj + A,Fj = 0 j = l,...,m 
3l / dk = F(y^ ,^...,y^ j,Xq ,^...,Xjjj) — 0 
where F^  and Fj are the partial derivatives of (4.1) with 
respect to its respective argument. The second order conditions 
for the maximization of profit require that the relevant 
bordered Hession determinants alternative in sign. Then, the 
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following relations can be derived from these first order 
conditions: 
Pi / Pk = Fi / Fjç. = - dy^ / j, k = l,...,n 
(4.7) Wj / Pk = - Fj / F% = / 8xj or Wj = pj^  (8y% / ôxj) 
j = 1,...,m and k = 1,..., n 
Wj / Wk = - 3xjç / 3xj j, k = l,...,m. 
Equation (4.7) states that the necessary conditions for profit 
maximization require that: (1) the rate of product 
transformation between every pair of outputs equals their price 
ratio, (2) the value of the marginal product of each input with 
respect to each output equals the input price, and (3) the rate 
of technical substitution between every pair of inputs equals 
their price ratio. 
It is of interest to note that because market prices are 
higher than state prices for outputs, producer's marginal 
decisions do not involve the state prices and quotas, that is, 
state prices and quotas have no impacts on the marginal decision 
making. It is only market prices that matter in making marginal 
decision for output supply and input demand if Y > Yg. 
Assuming the second order conditions are satisfied, the 
output supply and input demand functions can be derived from 
(4.6): 
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Y* = f(P, W) 
(4.8) 
X* = f(P, W) 
and the profit function is 
(4.9) n(P,W,EIV) = F'* Y* - W'*X* - EIV. 
It is clear that profit at the maximum is related to not only 
market prices but also the state prices and quotas reflected in 
the term of EIV. It is in this way that state prices and quotas 
matter in determining maximum attainable profit. 
The profit maximizing producer will respond to changes in 
input and output prices by varying his or her input and output 
level in order to continue to satisfy the necessary conditions. 
An increase of the jth output price, with other prices constant, 
will always increase the production of the jth output. An 
increase of the ith input price, with other prices unchanged, 
will always decrease the use of the ith input. Most of the 
cross effect may be of either sign depending upon the particular 
form of the implicit production function. Nevertheless, these 
cross effects are symmetry in nature. Furthermore, once a 
strictly positive output and variable input level have been 
chosen, they are unaffected by any changes in fixed inputs and 
exogenous variables (Henderson and Quandt, 1980), here are state 
prices and state quotas in question. 
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4.1.2 A dual approach 
It is known that in a competitive world with regular 
technology, there is one-to-one correspondence between the 
production technology and the dual profit function. The 
production technology can be examined directly in a primal 
framework or indirectly by a dual approach. The output supply 
and input demand relationships derived using the two approaches 
are identical. Consider the same farm with n outputs, m inputs, 
and k fixed inputs and exogenous variables. The variable, or 
restricted profit function is given by 
(4.10) n(P,W,F) = max [P'*Yf + P_'*Y_ - W'*X; (Y,X,F)eT] 
Yf,X 
where F is a kxl vector of fixed inputs or exogenous variables, 
and T is the farm's production possibility set. All other 
variable definations are the same as those in (4.2). Given the 
assumptions made for Equation (4.3), the profit function can be 
rewritten as; 
(4.11) II(P,W,EIV,F) = P'*Y - W'*X - EIV, 
and again, it is of standard form except for including an 
additional term of the surplus measure. 
The profit function possesses the properties described in 
Chapter 2.1; (l) It is a non-negative real valued function for 
all positive prices; (2) it is homogeneous of degree one in all 
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prices; (3) it is convex and continuous in P and W for every 
fixed input; (4) it is nondecreasing in output prices and 
nonincreasing in input prices; and (5) it is differentiable only 
if there exists a unique profit maximizing supply and input 
demand. 
If the function is differentiable then 
an / aw = - x*, 
an / ap = y^*, 
(4.12) 
an / aPg = Yg, and 
Y* = Yg + Yg*, 
where X* is optimal input demand, Y^ * is optimal output supply 
in free markets, and Y* is optimal total output supply. This 
property is referred to as Hotelling's lemma. These supply and 
input demand equations are the derivatives of profit function 
rather than the solution to a constrained profit maximization 
problem. However, these equations are consistent with 
maximization behaviors. 
Two additional properties are observed. One is that the 
matrix of second order derivatives of H(.) with respect to P and 
W is positive semidefinite. Another one is that, by Young's 
theorem in calculus, cross partial derivatives are equal (see 
(2.11) and (2.12)). These two properties imply that the 
comparative static results derived using a dual approach are 
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the same as those derived in a primal framework. An increase of 
the ith output price, with other prices unchanged, will always 
increase the supply of the ith output. An increase of the jth 
input price, holding other prices constant, will always decrease 
the use of jth input. Although the cross effects may be either 
sign, they must be symmetry. And changes in fixed inputs or 
exogenous variables do not have effects on the optimal output 
supply and input demand levels. 
4.2 Decision Rules Under Uncertainty 
The existence of guaranteed minimum price alters the 
original market price distribution to a truncated one. If a 
random price received by farmers for output over state quota, 
FP is defined such that: 
(4.13) FP = m 
if P < p m 
if P > p m 
then the truncated cumulative propability density function, 
G(FP) is defined as: 
(4.14) G(FP) = 
F(Pm) 
F(P) 
if P > p m 
if P < P. m 
and the expected price received by farmers, E(FP) can be 
expressed as: 
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(4.15) E(FP) = F(P^ ) * Pm + f Pf(P)dP, 
Pm 
where P^  ^is the minimum price guaranteed by the state, P is 
random unknown market price, F(P^ ) is subjective cumulative 
function of P^ ,^ F(P) is subjective cumulative function of P, 
f(P) is subjective probability density function of P. 
This system is illustrated in Figure 4.2. The minimum 
price is the truncated point for the original price 
distribution. The cumulative probability that the price will 
fall below P^ ^^  is represented by the hatched area. The 
probability equal to F(P^ ) is assigned at P = P^  in the 
truncated process. It is clear that the minimum price changes 
the first moment of the price distribution, the expected price, 
and the higher order moments of the unknown price. 
When producers are subject to uncertainty, it is assumed 
that the objective of the farm is to maximize the expected 
utility of profits and the producer obeys the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms. The utility function of the farm is 
concave, continuous, and differentiable function of profits, 
such that 
(4.16) au / an > 0 and a^u / an^ < o. 
Thus, the producer is assumed to be risk averse. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that production is certain while price is 
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f (P) 
Pm E(P) 
Figure 4.2. Truncation of a hypothetical probability 
distribution of market price 
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uncertainty. The producer's profit is given in Equations (4.2), 
(4.3) , and (4.4) . 
4.2.1 A primal approach 
Consider a price taking and risk averse farm producing n 
outputs with m variable inputs, and k fixed inputs and exogenous 
variables. The producer implicit expected utility function of 
profit is defined as: 
(4.17) E[U(n)] = U[P^ '*Y - (Pg, - Ps)'*Yg - W'*X]F(Pm) 
00 
+ / U[P'*Y - (P - Pg)'*Yg - W'X]f(P)dP, 
Pm 
where U denotes a strictly concave von Neumann-Mergenstern 
utility function, H is profit, P and Pg are nxl vectors of 
market prices and state prices of outputs, respectively, Y 
and Yg are nxl vectors of total outputs and outputs sold to 
the state at the state prices, respectively, W is a mxl vector 
of input prices, X is a mxl vector of variable inputs, P^  is a 
nxl vector of minimum prices of outputs, F(Pg^ ) is subjective 
cumulative probability function of Pjjj, and f(P) is subjective 
probability density function of P. 
The first order conditions for this optimization problem 
are: 
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(4.18) dE[U(n)3/dY = E[U]'pj^ Pj^ F(Pjjj) + / U'Pf(P)dP 
pm 
CO 
(4.19) dE[U(n)]/dX = E[U]'pmWF(Pm) + / U'Wf(P)dP 
pm 
where the subscript P^  ^behind E[U]' means the derivative is 
evaluated at the profit level corresponding to the guaranteed 
minimum price. 
Equations (4.18) and (4.19) show that producer decisions 
involve not only expected market prices, but also the state 
prices, minimum prices, the state quotas, and some terms that 
characterize the stochastic properties of prices other than 
their means, say ijt. Setting these first order conditions equal 
to zero and solving them simultaneously, we derive the optimal 
output supply and input demand functions as: 
Y* = f(P, W, Pg, Xg, P^ , t|f) 
(4.20) 
X* = f(P, W, Pg, Xg, P^ , i|r) 
and the implicit expected utility function of profit is 
(4.21) E[U(n)] = f(P, W, Pg, Xg, Pjn, i|»). 
4.2.2 A dual approach 
In the framework of a dual approach, we can specify a 
specific direct expected utility functional form 
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( 4 . 2 2 )  E [ V (n)] = n  +  S  
t=2 
where V denotes the indirect utility function, II stands for 
profit, represents the t-th central moment of H. Note 
that n is random because prices are random. Assuming that 
the second term in Equation (4.22) contains only the second 
central moment of n, then the variance of II, ajj is given by 
(4.23) aji = Y^ CTp2 + x2c t 2^ + 2YXCov(P,W) 
where is variance of output price, is variance of input 
price, and Cov(P,W) is covariance of P and W. Substituting 
expected profit in Equation (4.3) and (4.23) into (4.22) yields 
(4.24) E[V(n)] = E(P)Y - E(W)X - E(EIV) + . 
In this study, producers are assumed to be risk averse and 
display nonincreasing absolute risk averse. The expected 
direct utility function given in Equation (4.24) satisfies all 
the conditions [1] to [4] and assumptions developed in Chapter 
2. These conditions and assumptions imply that producers are 
constant risk averse. If producers are constant risk averse, 
then following functions can be arrived by Pope's corollary: 
aE[u(n)] / dw = - x*, 
(4.25) _ 
6 E [ U (n)]/ dp = Y f  ,  
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aE[U(n)] / aPg = Yg, and 
Y* = Yf* + Yg. 
and the symmetry conditions remain. These results are held when 
changes in expected prices has no impacts on other t-th central 
moments of prices. X* is input demand function and Y* is output 
supply function. 
4.3 Comparative Static Analysis 
The producer desires to maximize profit subject to 
technology possibility set. The neccesary conditions for profit 
maximization require that: (1) the rate of product 
transformation between every pair of outputs equals their price 
ratio, (2) the value of the marginal product of each input with 
respect to each output equal the input price, and (3) the rate 
of technical substitution between every pair of inputs equal 
their price ratio (Henderson and Quandt, 1980). 
The profit maximizing producer will respond to changes in 
input and output prices by varying his or her input and output 
level in order to continue to satisfy the neccesary conditions. 
An increase of the jth output price, with other prices constant, 
will always increase the production of the jth output. An 
increase of the ith input price, with other prices unchanged, 
will always decrease the use of the ith input. Most of the 
cross effect may be of either sign depending upon the particular 
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form of the implicit production function. Nevertheless, these 
cross effects are symmetric in nature. Furthermore, once a 
strictly positive output and variable input level have been 
chosen, they are unaffected by any changes in fixed inputs and 
exogenous variables. 
When producers are subject to uncertainty, however, 
meaningfull comparative static results are not as easily derived 
as under certainty. Previous studies (Sandmo, 1971; Batra and 
Ullah, 1974) have shown that simply assuming risk aversion is a 
very weak restriction on the farm's attitudes to risk. Sandmo 
(1971) and Batra and Ullah (1974) verified that nonincreasing 
absolute risk aversion is a sufficient condition for an upward 
sloping supply curve and downward sloping input demand curve. 
Sandmo and Ullah also showed that unlike under certainty, 
changes in fixed input do have impacts on the positive optimal 
output and input levels. Employing envelope theorem. Pope 
(1980) found that if producer is constant absolute risk 
aversion, the expected utility function is separable, and the 
ratio of the effects of changes of input price to the effect of 
changes of output price on optimal output is equal to the ratio 
of optimal input level to optimal output level (see [1], [2], 
and [4] in Chapter 2.2), the symmetry conditions will hold when 
risk aversion prevails. 
For the comparative static analysis of present study, let 
start with one output case. The results are then needed to be 
extended to multiple product analysis. It is assumed that the 
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producer produce one single output with capital, K, and labor, 
L, as inputs. The capital input is assumed to be quasi fixed 
while the labor input is assumed to be completely variable. By 
this, we mean that the capital input is purchased before the 
output price uncertainty is resolved, but the labor input is 
chosen until after it is resolved. It is also assumed that the 
producer has a subjective probability distribution for output 
price, P, before it is actually observed. Finally, it is 
assumed that capital price, Z, and wage rate, W, are known with 
certainty. 
Since the labor input is chosen after the capital input has 
been determined and after the output price is known, labor will 
be chosen to maximize•short-run profits, 
(4.26) n = PY(K,L) - WL - EIV. 
where EIV is the equivalent income variation of the output. The 
first-order condition for this optimization is 
(4.27) an / ÔL = P ÔY / dL - W = 0, 
which can be solved for the optimal labor input demand, 
(4.28) L* = f (K, P, W) . 
Substituting L* into (4.26) yields the short-run profit 
function. 
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(4.29) n(K,P,W,EIV) = PY(K,L*(K,P,W)) - WL*(K,P,W) - EIV 
= G(K,P,W) - EIV. 
If the producer uses labor optimally in the short-run, 
long-run profits are 
(4.30) H = G(K,P,W) - ZK - EIV. 
At the time the capital input is chosen, H is clearly a 
random function because P is a subjective random variable. The 
producer is assumed to be risk averse. In the long run, the 
producer will choose capital input to maximize the expected 
utility function of profits, 
(4.31) EU(II) = EU[G(K,P,W) - ZK - EIV], 
where U is a strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function. 
The first order condition with respect to K gives 
(4.32) SEU / ax = E[U'(n)(P 8G / 8K - Z)] = 0. 
The capital input demand function is then derived by 
solving (4.32), 
(4.33) K* = f(P, W, Z, EIV, *), 
where P is expected output price, and ijr is the terms of other 
moments of output price distribution. The output supply 
function is given by 
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(4.34) Y* = f(P, W, Z, EIV, *). 
Above analyses give rise to the fact that under current mixed 
planning and market system with uncertainty output price, not 
only the market prices but also the state prices and quotas 
affect the marginal decision for output supply and input demand 
for capital through their impacts on producer income—equivalent 
income variation if Y* > Yg. 
The following comparative static results can be derived 
from Equation (4.32): 
SK* / aPs = - EUkps / EUhj i 0 
BK* / aig = - EUjjys / < 0 
(4.35) dK* / dZ = - EU^ g / EU%% < 0 
8K* / aw = - EUj^  / EUj^  ? 0 
dK* / aP = - EUj^ p / EU]^  > 0. 
Since EU%% is negative for maximization, the signs in (4.35) are 
the same for the numerators. The derivatives of EUj^  with 
respect to Pg, Yg, Z, W, and P are shown below; 
EUjcps = E[u"(n) (p aG / aK - z) (an / asiv) 
(aEiv /aPg)] > 0 
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EUj^yg = E[u"(n) (p dG / bk - z) (an / asiv) 
(8EIV / 8Yg)] < 0 
(4.36) EU%2 = E[U"(a)(P dG / dK - Z)K + U'(3)(-1)] < 0 
EUj^  = E[U"(8) (P dG / dK - Z)8G / 8W 
+ U' (8)P d^G / dKdVJ] ? 0 
EUj^p = E[u"(n) (p 6G / 8K - z) an / ap 
+  u ' ( n ) (  a c  /  a K  +  p  a ^ c  /  a n a p ) ]  >  o .  
Note that nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for these signs. For the proof and 
discussion of these results see Sandmo (1971) and Batra and 
Ullah (1974). Because the production function is assumed to 
have positive marginal product of its input, same comparative 
static results can be derived for the output supply. 
The relation between capital input demanded and expected 
output price can also be expressed explicitly, 
(4.37) aK* / dp = dK* / dP + {dK* / dEIV){dEIV / dP), 
that is changes in expected output price have two effects, 
direct and indirect. The indirect effect through equivalent 
income variation shows how the producers respond to the changes 
in expected mgfket price as a result of anticipated income 
effect. Note that the indirect effect will vanish if the state 
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and expected market prices change by the same amount, given the 
state quota Yg. This is because the negative effects of changes 
in the state price and positive effects of changes in expected 
market price are cancelled. 
There are many ways in which this analysis can be extended 
and generalized over the farm with multiple outputs and multiple 
inputs. Because producers are able to spread risks by output 
diversification, it is particular interest to explore the 
comparative static analysis under uncertainty. 
The mathematical derivation of the comparative static 
results in the case of multiple outputs and multiple inputs must 
be very complicated. However, by explorting into the 
implication of convexity of utility function of profits as 
implied by maximization of expected utility and imposing 
condition of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the supply 
curves are upward sloping and input demand curves are downward 
sloping. This implies that an increase of the ith output price, 
giving other prices constant, will always increase the supply of 
ith output. An increase of jth input price, with other prices 
unchanged, will always decrease the use of the jth input. The 
cross effects are indeterminant depending on the particular 
production possibility set and the way the producer to spread 
the risks over the multiple outputs and multiple inputs. Under 
the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, the symmetry 
cross signs are preserved. 
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4 . 4  Supply and Input Demand Equations 
The present study assumes that the producer is risk averse 
and displays constant absolute risk aversion. To be consistent 
with these assumptions, an expected utility function of profits 
in (2.27) is employed to represent the producer risk preference 
and a normalized quadratic functional form is used to represent 
variable profit function. The profit function is assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean ix and variance a^ . And the mean 
is equal to the expected value of profits. 
The expected utility function of profit which is of 
normalized quadratic form is as follows: 
q-1 K G 
(4.38) E[U(n)] = Oq + S ot^ EPi + S c%Z% + S d_EIV 
i=l k=l g=l ^  
q-1 q-1 K L 
+ Z Z b^ E^PijEPj + Z Z Gifi ZifZ-i 
i=l 1=1  ^] k=l 1=1 *1 * 1 
G H q-1 K 
+ f hEIVgEIVh + z Z gixEPiZk 
g=l h=l i=l k=l 
q-1 G KG T 
+ Z Z hi-EPjEIV- + Z Z It-Z^ EIV- + Z a^ a^ . i=l g=i 19 1 9 k=l g=1^ 9 k g t=2 t t 
where EP^ 's are the expected prices of outputs and inputs, Z^ 's 
are fixed inputs and exogenous variables, represents the t-th 
central moment of profit distribution, and a, /3, c, d, e, f, g, 
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h, and 1 are parameters to be estimated. All others are the 
same as defined in previous discussion. 
Assuming that changes in expected market prices have no 
impacts on the second- and higher-order central moments, by 
Pope's corollary, the derivative of E[U] with respect to 
normalized expected output price gives optimal supply and 
derivative of E[U] with respect to normalized expected input 
price yields optimal (negative) input demand as follows, 
(4.39) Yi = Ygi + Yfi 
q-1 G K 
= @1 + Z bi^ EP^  + S h^ _EIV„ + S gi%Z% i=l,...,n j=l g=l  ^  ^ k=l 
q-1 G K 
(4.40) -Xj = + s bjjEPj + S hi_EIV„ + S gj^Z^ i=l,...,m-l j=l g=l ^   ^ k=l 
q-1 q-1 K 
(4.41) -X_ = a- - 0.5 S S CjjEPjEPj + S g^ Z*. 
i=l j=l ^  ^   ^ k=l * * 
Equations (4.39) through (4.41) are the system of supply 
and input demand equations to be estimated subject to all the 
theoretical restrictions of monotonicity, homogeneity, symmetry, 
and convexity. 
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5 DATA AMD ESTIMATION 
This chapter describes the data set used for the 
estimation. This description is followed by a discussion of the 
aggregation procedures used for the data aggregates. Finally, 
the procedure of estimation of the empirical analysis of the 
supply module for the Chinese agriculture is expressed. 
5.1 Data 
Aggregate annual agricultural data for China were used in 
the estimation. The sample period covers years from 1978 to 
1988. Endogenous variables consist of seven outputs (n=7): 
grain protein feed, other food products, nonfood agricultural 
products, bovine and ovine meat, dairy products, and other meat; 
two variable inputs; fertilizer and feed. Thirteen exogenous 
variables include prices of outputs and inputs, two fixed inputs 
—land and animal inventory, equivalent income variation of 
grain, and a time variable representing technological changes 
over time (m=13). Table 5.1 gives the variable definitions, 
units, and sources of data. 
Data for grain, fertilizer, animal inventory, and land were 
collected from various issues of Statistical Yearbook of China 
and China Trade and Price Statistics. Since these data are 
directly available, aggregation of data over commodities is not 
necessary. The remaining data on outputs and inputs, however. 
Table 5.1. Variable definitions, units, and sources of data 
Name Explanation Units Sources 
GRAIN Grain, production Million tons SYC& 
PFDFC Protein feed from crops, production Million ton protein Derived^  
OFDFC Other food from crops, production Million 1000 Yuan^  Derived" 
NFDAG Nonfood agriculture, production Million 1000 Yuan Derived^  
BOMET Bovine and ovine meat, production Million ton carcass weight Derived^  
DAIRY Dairy product, production Million ton milk Derived^  
OTHEM Other meat, production Million ton protein Derived" 
LNDUS Land use Million hecter SYC 
FERUS Fertilizer use Million ton SYC 
FEDUS Feed use Quantity index Derived™ 
NANIN Number of livestock inventory Million head SYC 
EIVGN Equivalent income variation of grain Million Yuan Derived® 
GRANP Grain, market price Yuan/ton SYC, CPTsf 
PFFCP Protein feed from crops, price Yuan/unit Derived^  
OFFCP Other food from crops, price Yuan/unit Derived^  
NFDAP Nonfood agriculture, price Yuan/unit Derived^  
BOMTP Bovine and ovine meat, price Yuan/ton DerivedP 
DAIRP Dairy product, price Yuan/ton Derived^  
OTHMP Other meat, price Yuan/ton Derived" 
FERTP Fertilizer, price Yuan/ton SYC, CPTS 
FEEDP Feed, price Price index Derived* 
S^tatistical Yearbook of China. 1983. 1984. 1985. 1986. 1987. 1988. and 1989. 
T^hese data are derived by aggregating various FAO (Food and Agricultural 
Organization, Rome) and World Bank data series. A more detailed description of data 
are available with the author. 
Table 5.1. (continued) 
C^hinese currency. 
*%hese data derived from data reported in Table A.4. 
®These data are derived from data series collected from SYC and CPTS and presented 
in Table 3.1. 
fChina Trade and Price Statistics. 1952-1983 and 1988. 
vl 
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are aggregate in nature and data are not available at this level 
of aggregation. It is thus necessary to arrive the quantity and 
price aggregates for these groups. 
This study follows the aggregation logic and compilation 
procedure developed by Fischer and Sichra (Fischer and Sichra, 
1983). The Supply Utilization Accounts on agricultural products 
(SUA), the original data published by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, has been the starting 
point for the aggregation. Time series about 500 agricultural 
commodities are covered in the aggregation to arrive at nine 
target commodities. Six of them are used as remaining outputs 
in our estimation. They are protein feed from crop, other food 
from crop, nonfood agricultural products, bovine meat, dairy 
products, and other meats. 
The target commodities represent three types of products. 
The first one is characterized by alternative derived products. 
This situation occurs when the higher level commodity is 
processed in different ways to give various derived products. 
The second type is called joint derived products. They 
represent the case when the processing of a commodity results in 
several derived products simultaneously. The last type is the 
general case where a commodity A has M jointly derived products 
and N alternative derived products. The aggregation procedures 
for different type products are accordingly formulated. For the 
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complete commodity list and detailed aggregation description see 
Fischer and Sichra. 
The group of aggregated grains includes rice, wheat, corn, 
sorghum, barley, rye, and oats. Soybeans and tubers which are 
accounted as grain in the Chinese statistics are taken away from 
the total grain production. The share of soybeans and tubers in 
total grain is calculated first. Then same share is taken out 
of the quantities of total supply, sale to the state, and sale 
in the free market when the model is estimated. By doing so, 
double accounting of tubers and soybeans is eliminated, since 
Fischer and Sichra's aggregates include tuber and soybeans 
already. Table A.l in Appendix gives the productions of total 
grain (including tubers and soybeans), tubers, and soybeans as 
well as the percentage of tubers and soybeans in total grain 
production. 
The grain output sold to the state is set equal to the 
quota plus above quota levels for the years before 1985, and to 
the contracted quota thereafter to reflect the policy situation 
as described in Chapter 3. Similarly, the state price is set 
equal to the weighted average of quota price and above quota 
price for the period before 1985, and to the contracted price 
after that. The market quantity is the sum of the negotiated 
sale to the state and the sale in free markets. Accordingly, 
the market price is equal to the weighted average of state 
negotiated price and free market price. The equivalent income 
80 
variation is, then, equal to the difference of state price and 
market price times the state quota. Because the data are not 
complete, some estimates are used to be the proxy of the missing 
data. For the complete data used for estimation and 
calculation formulas see Table A.2 in Appendix. 
Fertilizer is one of the important variable inputs in crop 
production. The elemental nutrients contained in fertilizer are 
nitrogen (N), phosphoric acid (P2O5)' potash (KgO). Since 
only the nutrients contained in fertilizer contribute to crop 
production and different mixed grade fertilizers contain 
different nutrients or different combination of the nutrients, 
the quantity of fertilizer use is calculated on the basis of 100 
percent effectiveness. This means the total fertilizer input 
use is the summation of the quantities of actual nutrients. 
Data of fertilizer consumption calculated on the basis of actual 
nutrients are collected directly from Statistical Yearbook of 
China, various issues. 
Feed is the most important variable input in livestock 
production. Various farm products and by products are used as 
livestock feeds in China. To keep the model manageable, it is 
desirable treat all kinds of feeds as a composite one. The 
procedure used to aggregate these feeds into one group will 
described later on in this chapter. 
Land utilization is under restrictive control of the 
government in China. Land transaction is allowed only recently 
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in limited form and extent so there is no systematic and 
complete data on the land transaction. As arable land is a 
critical factor in the Chinese agricultural production, land is 
treated as a fixed input in the present study. Data on total 
sown areas of land were collected from the various issues of 
Statistical Yearbook of China and presented in Table A.2 in 
Appendix. 
Animal inventory at the end of previous year has 
significant impacts on the livestock production in the following 
year. The lagged animal inventory is, thus, used as a fixed 
input in this model. The total animal inventory is the 
summation of year-end figures of cattle, buffalo, hog, goat, and 
sheep and were collected from various issues of the Statistical 
Yearbook of China. Data on the total inventory can be found in 
Table A.2 in Appendix. 
Various technological progress have improved the Chinese 
crop and livestock productivity. To capture the impacts of such 
technical advancement on the Chinese agriculture, a time 
variable is used in all supply and input demand equations to be 
estimated. 
The data of quantities and prices of other six groups of 
outputs derived using Fischer and Sichra's aggregation procedure 
are presented in Table A.3 in Appendix. Output and input 
quantities and their respective prices are scaled such that the 
units of gross revenues, production times output price, and 
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expenditures, input usage times input price, are always million 
yuan at current prices. Unlike grain data, the FAO aggregates 
for these six target commodities are available only for the 
years prior to 1987. To increase the number of observations, 
thus add degree of freedom in estimation, the quantities in 1987 
and 1988 and prices in 1987 are estimated using time trend 
method. The estimates are then used as the proxy of these data. 
Note that the FAO nine target commodities are arrived from 
about 500 primary agricultural products. It is not necessary to 
list all time series of 500 products in Appendix in this study. 
Interested readers can find these time series data in the 
Supply Utilization Accounts on agricultural products, the 
original data published by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization. 
Given these aggregate data, the Tornquist approximation to 
Divisia index (Tornquist, 1936; Diewert, 1976; Trivedi, 1981) 
was used as necessary to aggregate price and quantity for feeds 
which involve most of agricultural products. The Tornquist 
approximation to Divisia index is as follows: 
N 
(5.1) Dt = S (l/2)(Pit*Yit/Et + Pit-l*^it-l/Et-l)*Log(Pit/Pit-l) 
1=1 
(5.2) = Pt_i * exp(Dt), 
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N 
Where = S Pit*%it' ^ it price of ith good in time t, is 
i=l 
production of ith good, and is Divisia price index. The 
implicit quantity index, is derived by formula: 
(5.3) Yt = Et / Pf 
For the data used to derive Divisia index as well as derived 
Divisia price index and quantity index are presented in Table 
A.4 in Appendix. 
5.2 Estimation Procedure 
Because the model is specified for the current Chinese 
economy, only observations after 1977 are relevant. Thus, the 
sample is restricted to years 1978 through 1988. This small 
sample of observations is a critical and constraining issue in 
the present study. To accommodate reasonable degrees of freedom 
in the estimation, simplifying assumptions are made to reduce 
the number of parameters to be estimated. More specifically, 
nonjointness between crop and livestock sectors has been assumed 
and imposed in the estimation. 
Because the Chinese government ensures that if market grain 
price is lower than the state quota price, the government has 
an obligation to buy all quantities of grains provided by 
farmers, the state price is, in fact, the floor price. Thus, 
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market grain price distribution has low bound. The expected 
market price of grain is assumed to be of form: 
(5.4) E(Pt) = Max Pgt), 
that is, farmers' expectated market price of grain is equal to 
lagged market price if it is higher than what is announced 
for this year's state price. If the state price which is 
known when farmers are making production decisions is higher 
than the market price of last year, farmers are sure that the 
market price of grain in this year will at least as high as 
the state price. 
The market price distributions for other commodities are 
quite different because there are no lower bound for these 
market prices. For these commodities, naive adaptive price 
expectations are assumed in the present study, that is, 
(5.5) E(Pt) = Pt-i-
All prices in crop sector are normalized by the price of 
nonfood agriculture and all prices in livestock sector are by 
feed price index. And, hence these equations are homogeneous of 
degree zero in all prices. This functional form ensures that 
the profit function is homogeneous of degree one in all output 
and input prices. 
Symmetry of expected utility function in cross partials 
requires that equations (4.39) to (4.41) are to be estimated 
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sub]ect to the symmetry constraint; 
(5.6) bij = bji V i,j e [1,. 
Monotonicity of the profit function implies that the 
indirect expected utility function is also monotonie when the 
utility function is of a special form described in Equation 
(2.36). Monotonicity requires that predicted and must be 
nonnegative for all prices. This property can be evaluated at 
each sample point after the estimated parameters are obtained. 
There is no need to impose this restriction in priori to the 
model. 
The convexity of indirect utility function is satisfied if 
the matrix of b^ j coefficients in equations to be estimated is 
positive semidefinite. Thus, supply and input demand equations 
must be estimated subject to 
(5.7) [b^ j] is positive semidefinite. 
The convexity of the utility function can be checked by 
evaluation if the matrix of estimated parameters b^ j* is indeed 
positive semidefinite. This procedure can, however, not impose 
the property of convexity in the model when it is estimated. 
There are two approaches that reparameterize b^ j in the 
equation system subject to condition (5.7) while the system is 
estimated. One is Cholesky factorization. Another one is 
eigenvalue decomposition. This study will use eigenvalue 
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decomposition method to impose the restriction of convexity. 
The eigenvalue decomposition methodology relies on the 
property that a real symmetric matrix is positive semidefinite 
if and only if all its eigenvalues are nonnegative. Following 
this protocol, the convexity is imposed by restricting the 
smallest eigenvalue to be nonnegative when matrix [b^ j] is 
reparameterized and implied eigenvalues of the matrix are 
calculated. Although this procedure requires a lot computation 
work, the modern computer can handle this job. The parameter 
estimates subject to all theoretical restrictions are obtained 
using Fortran-GQ-OPT, version 5.0. 
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6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND MODEL EXAMINATION 
This chapter provides the empirical estimation results of 
the theoretical model developed in the previous chapters. The 
validation of the model is examined following the analysis of 
the empirical results. 
6.1 Output Supply and Input Demand Equations 
6.1.1 Output supply and input demand equations of full model 
Joint generalized least squares estimates of output supply 
and input demand equations maintaining homogeneity, symmetry, 
and convexity are presented in Table 6.1 and Table 2. The 
t-ratios reported in the parentheses must be interpreted with 
caution since the sample size is small. These t-ratios may only 
give us approximations of significance of these estimates. 
In the restricted model, all of the own price coefficients 
of outputs and inputs are positive indicating that an increase 
of the ith output price will always increase the production of 
the ith output and an increase of the jth input price wll always 
decrease the use of the jth input, with other prices constant. 
This means that the estimated output supply curves are upward 
sloping and the estimated input demand curves are downward 
sloping. 
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Table 6.1. Estimation of output supply and input demand 
equations of crop model 
GRAIN^  = -14219.00616 + 92.12804 * GRANP^  + 1.33165 * PFFCP^  
(100.969)3 (0.592) (0.139) 
- 12.57475 * NFAGPt - 37.30718 * FERTP^  
(0.896) (1.934) 
- 7.33405 * LNDUS^ + 7.84528 * YEARj. 
(0.859) (13.016) 
- 2.01601D-9 * EIVGN^  
(6.917D-10) 
R-square = 0.89 
PFDFCt = -901.71481 + 1.33165 * GRANP^ . + 2.28120 * PFFCP^  
(2.224) (0.139) (0.765) 
+ 0.30490 * NFAGPt - 12.73605 * FERTP^  
(0.292) (1.463) 
+ 0.10182 * LNDUS^  + 0.45011 * YEAR^  
(0.250) (2.176) 
- 0.04071 * EIVGNt 
(0.299) 
R-square = 0.99 
F^igures in parentheses are approximate and absolute values 
of t-ratios. 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
NFDAGj. = -823.98508 - 12.57475 * GRANP^ + 0.30490 * PFFCP^ 
(4.777) (0.896) (0.292) 
+ 2.03715 * NFAGPt + 2.28610 * FERTP*. 
(0.979) (0.933) 
+ 0.20682 * LNDUS^ + 0.40298 * YEARi. 
(0.339) (4.246) 
+ 0.15960 * EIVGNt 
(0.648) 
R-square = 0.86 
FERUS^ = 3791.61883 - 37.30718 * GRANP^ - 12.73605 * PFFCP^ 
(79.274) (1.934) (1.463) 
+ 2.28610 * NFAGP^ + 87.90501 * FERTP^ 
(0.933) (2.436) 
+ 0.16029 * LNDUS^ - 1.93210 * YEAR^ 
(0.191) (31.646) 
+ 0.19448 * EIVGNt 
(0.528) 
R-square = 0.98 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
OFDFCt^  = -2171.66752 
(5.848) 
+ 0.64929 
(3.086) 
* LNDUS^  + 1.06829 * YEARi. 
(5.903) 
+ 0.36632 * 
(2.515) 
EIVGN^  - 0 
N-1 N-1 
.5 2 Z bjj EPj^  EPJ^  
i=l j=l 
R-square = 0.86 
System statistics: 
Log-likelihood value: - 1.839 R2* = O.99G 
T^his equation was estimated conditional on the rest of 
the crop system. Thus, N-1 includes all other netputs in crop 
sector. 
•^ Baxter-Craigg R-square, see text for details. 
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Table 6.2. Estimation of output supply and input demand 
equations of livestock model 
BOMETt = -208.67020 + 0.00017 * BOMTP^  + 0.00031 * DAIRP^  
(208.544)3 (2.267) (1.044) 
- 0.000004 * OTHMPx. + 0.00135 * NANIN^  
(1.000) (1.711) 
+ 0.10551 * YEARt 
(187.787) 
R-square = 0.99 
DAIRY^  = -573.000 + 0.00031 * BOMTP^  + 0.00072 * DAIRP^  
(572.973) (1.044) (0.398) 
- 0.00002 * OTHMP*. - 0.00044 * NANIN^  + 0.29106 * YEAR,. 
(0.138) (0.136) (272.598) 
R-square = 0.99 
OTHEMt = -418.31963 - 0.000004 * BOMTP^  - 0.00002 * DAIRP^  
(395.434) (1.000) (1.384) 
+ 0.000004 * OTHMTt - 0.00071 * NANIN^  
(0.230) (0.192) 
+ 0.21248 * YEARt 
(170.099) 
R-square = 0.97 
F^igures in parentheses are approximate and absolute values 
of t-ratios. 
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Table 6.2. (continued) 
FEDUS^  ^= 1893396.87 + 13.65500 * NANINx 
(7.917) (0.782) 
N-1 N-1 
- 1964.17200 * YEAR+. - 0.5 S Z EP^  ^
(7.768)  ^ i=l j=l 
R-square = 0.93 
System statistics: 
Log-likelihood value: -2.28297 R^ * = 0.99® 
T^his equation was estimated conditional on the rest of 
the livestock system. Thus N-1 includes all other netputs in 
livestock sector. 
B^axter-Craigg R-square, see text for details. 
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Changes in market price of grain will have two effects: 
direct and indirect. The indirect effect through equivalent 
income variation indicates how producers respond to the changes 
as a result of anticipated income effects. Note that the 
indirect effect will vanish if the state price changes by the 
same amount as the market price given the state quota constant. 
The equivalent income variation of grain is negatively 
related to grain production, protein feed from crops, and 
fertilizer use while positively related to other crop 
production. This implies that the impacts of equivalent income 
variation of grain are not necessary to be negative for all 
production for a utility maximizer under constant risk aversion. 
Same results can be derived for a profit maximizer under 
certainty. 
All the parameters for time trend are positive for output 
supplies and negative for (negative) input demands indicating 
progressive technical change in Chinese agriculture. However, 
by the approximations of t-ratios one is not able to determine 
if it is global indirect Hicks neutral technical progress or 
technical changes of some other forms. 
Monotonicity of expected indirect utility function (3E(U*)/ 
3P£ > 0) implies that estimated output supplies and (negative) 
input demands must be nonnegative. Model simulation with 
estimated parameters proved that monotonicity was not violated 
at the sample points. 
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While homogeneity in prices is ensured in normalized 
quadratic profit functional form, the symmetry property is not 
tested in the present study due to following considerations. 
The first one is to save degrees of freedom so that the 
empirical estimation can be carried out in this study. 
Estimation of the model without symmetry restriction needs nine 
more parameters. However, the sample size is small because the 
model incorporates the current Chinese economic system. This 
means that only observations for the years 1978 through 1988 are 
relevant. Furthermore, eigenvalue decomposition method has 
already made the model highly parameterized. The second one is 
that maintaining symmetry is necessary to test convexity when 
eigenvalue decomposition methodology is employed. 
To test for the convexity, unrestricted model maintaining 
homogeneity and symmetry without imposing convex restriction 
needs to be estimated. The coefficients of own prices and the 
associated t-ratios from restricted and unrestricted models are 
presented in Table 6.3. Again, because of small sample size, 
these t-ratios can only give approximations of significance of 
these estimates. The estimates show that one out of seven own 
price parameters estimated without imposing convex restriction 
is negative. This indicates a negatively sloped output supply 
function which violates the convex property of the expected 
indirect utility function under the assumption of constant risk 
aversion. 
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Table 6.3. Comparision of own price coefficients 
of restricted and unrestricted models 
Unrestricted Model® Restricted Model^  
Estimates t -ratios Estimates t--ratios 
GRANP 106.78646 0.703 92.12804 0.592 
PFFCP -6.87124 0.223 2.28120 0.765 
NFAGP 2.02632 0.781 2.03715 0.979 
FERTP 258.45847 1.238 87.90501 2.436 
BOMTP 0.00016 1.480 0.00017 2.267 
DAIRP 0.00038 0.076 0.00072 0.390 
OTHMP 0.000003 0.010 0.000004 0.230 
C^onvexity not imposed. 
C^onvexity imposed. 
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The convexity restriction can be imposed by the eigenvalue 
decomposition method. This methodology relies on the ground 
that a real symmetric matrix is positive semidefinite if and 
only if all its eigenvalues are nonnegative. Based on this 
property, the convexity is imposed by restricting the smallest 
eigenvalue to be nonnegative when matrix [b^ j] is 
reparameterized and implied eigenvalues are calculated. 
Estimated model maintaining all theoretical restrictions 
fits the data reasonably well. R-square coefficients ranged 
from 0.85 for other food from crop output supply equation to 
0.99 for protein feed suuply, bovine and ovine meat supply, and 
dairy product supply equations (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). 
Six out of nine R-square coefficients are at or higher than 
0.90, accounting for 67 percent of the total. Five out of nine 
R-square coefficients are higher than 0.95, about 56 percent of 
the total R-square coefficients. 
An overall indication of explanatory power of the entire 
model can be measured by the "generalized R-square", R^ *, 
developed by Baxter and Cragg (1970). The generalized R-square 
is defined as: 
(6.1) r2* = 1 - exp[2(Lo - Lmax)/?]' 
where Lq is the value of the log-likelihood function when all 
parameters but intercepts were constrainted to zero; I»max 
the maximized value of the log likelihood when all parameters 
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are allowed to vary; and T is the total number of observations. 
The R^ * coefficient for the estimated crop model in Table 6.1 
is 0.99 and livestock model in Table 6.2 is 0.99, indicating 
that the overall goodness fits are high. 
There is, however, a problem associated with the coefficient 
of equivalent income variation in the grain supply equation. 
The theoretical model developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 shows 
that equivalent income variation has effects on output supply 
and input demand. The empirical evidence obtained using general 
linear model does not support that economic hypothesis. Even 
the sign of the coefficient of equivalent income variation in 
grain supply is desireble, the magnitude is so small 
(- 0.000000002) that it can be approximated to zero. This leads 
a conclusion that equivalent income variation due to the state 
grain quota and the state grain price has almost no effects on 
grain supply. This obviously does not reflect the economic 
situation in China. Hence, further effort is needed to explore 
the problem. 
6.1.2 Multicollinearitv 
The general linear model is an extremely powerful and 
widely used statistical tool. As in all statistical 
applications, however, the power of the method depends on the 
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underlying assumptions being fulfilled for the particular 
application in question. 
One of the basic assumptions of the general linear model is 
that the data matrix X, which is of order n x k, has rank k. 
This implies that no linear dependence exists between the 
explanatory variables. The reason for this assumption is that 
the least-square estimator B* = (X'X)~^ Y reqires the inversion 
of X'X, which is impossible if the rank of X, and hence the rank 
of X'X, is less than k. This is the case of extreme 
multicollinearity which exists when some or all of the 
explanatory variables are perfectly collinear. A less extreme 
but still very serious case arises when the assumption is only 
just satisfied, that is when some or all of the explanatory 
variables are highly but not perfectly collinear (Johnson, 
1984). 
Multicollinearity is associated with the fact that 
economists observe, but not set or control, the values of the 
explanatory variables that produce or condition values of the 
dependent variables. More specifically, economic variables are 
often related in general ways, and when the statistical results 
are ambiguous because of interrelationships among the 
explanatory variables, a multicollinearity problem is said to 
exist. The statistical ambiguity arises because, when 
explanatory variables have linear associations, their 
coefficients' estimates tend to have large sampling errors, and 
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thus the actual estimates may be far from the true parameter 
values. This is because a variable coefficient is interpreted 
as the effect of a one-unit changes in an explanatory variable 
on the dependent variable, all other things held constant. If 
in a sample, the variation in an explanatory variable is 
persistently related to variation in one or more other 
explanatory variables, the resulting variation in the dependent 
variable can not be accurately attributed to a specific source. 
The multicollinearity can result in following main negative 
consequences (Johnson, 1984; Judge et al., 1982). First, the 
precision of estimation falls so that it becomes very difficult, 
if not impossible, to disentangle the relative influences of 
the various explanatory variables. Second, coefficients may 
not appear significantly from zero and may be excluded from the 
analysis, not because the associated variable has no effect but 
because the set of sample data has not enabled us to pick it up. 
Third, estimates of coefficients become very sensitive to 
particular sets of sample data, and the addition of a few more 
observations can sometimes produce dramatic shifts in some of 
the coefficients. These situation may occur despite possibly 
high R-square or F values, indicating a model that fits the data 
well. 
There are some ways to detect multicollinearity (Judge et 
al., 1984). The first one is to check simple correlations among 
regressors. A commonly used rule is that if the correlation 
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between the values of two regressors is greater than 0.8 or 0.9, 
then multicollinearity is a serious problem. A modification of 
this rule compares the simple correlation coefficients to 
R-square, multicollinearity is then interpreted as harmful if 
the simple correlation is greater than R-square. 
The second method is to evaluate determinant of X'X. If the 
regressor variables are standardized so that they have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of unity, then X*X contains 
element that are simple correlation coefficients between the 
regressors. In that case the determinant of X'X falls in the 
interval [0,1]. If det (X'X) =0, then one or more exact linear 
dependencies exist among the columns of X. If det (X'X) = 1, 
then the columns of X are orthogonal. 
The third approach is called auxiliary regressions. It is 
to regress each of the independent variables on the other 
(K - 1) regressors. If the value of R-square is high, a near-
exact linear dependence among the columns of X is indicated. 
Also, if the multicollinearity involves only a few variables 
so that the auxiliary regressions do not suffer from extensive 
multicollinearity, the estimated coefficients may reveal the 
nature of the linear dependence among the regreesors. 
The last method is named as matrix decompositions. The 
analysis of the characteristic roots and vectors of the X'X 
matrix can reveal much about the presence and nature of 
multicollinearity. The number of relative small characteristic 
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roots (relative to the largest) indicates the number of near-
linear dependencies among the columns of X. Whether or not the 
multicollinearity is harmful depends on whether the small 
characteristic roots contribute a large amount to the variance 
of estimates. 
To see if multicollinearity exists in the data used in the 
estimation, the first and the second methods are employed to 
analyze the data used in the crop model. The correlation matrix 
for the regressors is presented in Table 6.4. The determinant 
of the correlation matrix, which is the standardized X'X matrix, 
is 0.003. This value falls at the low end of the interval [0,1] 
indicating the existing of multicollinearity in the data of crop 
equivalent income variation of grain is 0.853, which is greater 
than 0.8 indicating that multicollinearity is a serious problem. 
Because all other correlation coefficients are small than 0.8, 
multicollinearity is obviously due to high correlation between 
grain price and equivalent income variation of grain. Since 
equivalent income variation is defined as the product of the 
state grain quota and the differenc between grain price and the 
state grain price, that is, equivalent income variation is 
related the level of grain price, this must cause the problem 
of multicollinearity in the data set of crop sector. 
Once multicollinearity has been detected and deemed serious 
enough to warrant further effort to mitigate its ill effects, 
a variety of alternative strategies should be pursued. Several 
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Table 6.4. Regressor correlation matrix for crop model 
GRANP PFFCP NFAGP FERTP EIVGN 
GRANP 1.000 
PFFCP -0.336 1.000 
NFAGP 0.354 0.377 1.000 
FERTP 0.480 0.210 0.205 1.000 
EIVGN 0.853 —0.540 0.214 0.068 
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methods have been proposed for coping with multicollinearity. 
These include obtaining additional sample data, applying exact 
linear restrictions, applying stochastic linear restrictions, 
and finding a slightly biased estimator with a much smaller 
variance using ridge regression. Since additional sample data 
are not available and linear restrictions may result in adverse 
consequences, ridge regression approach is used in this study to 
deal with the serious problem of multicollinearity. 
6.1.3 Ridae regression 
Ridge regression as developed by Hoerl and Kennard (1970) 
is a biased estimation procedure which generally arrives 
coefficient estimates with lower variances than ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS). In general 
(6.2) MSE = VARIANCE + BIAS 
Ridge regression increases bias but reduces variance so that 
with small amounts of bias an overall reduction in MSE is 
possible. 
The ridge regression estimator is 
(6.3) = [X'X + KI]-lx'Y, 
where the scalar K is chosen arbitrarily with a value usually 
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between zero and one. If K = 0 the ridge estimates reduce to 
ordinary least squares. In application, K is to be chosen in 
such a way that the resulting estimates are "stable," presumably 
with respect to small variations in K. It is easily shown that 
although the ridge estimator is biased, 
(6.4) E[B^ ] = [X'X + KI]"^ X'X/3, 
its variance 
(6.5) Var[Bj.] = e2[X'X + KI]"^  (X'X) [X'X + KI]-1, 
where is the variance of the disturbance, is smaller than 
that of the ordinary least squares estimator. As a result the 
ridge estimators often have a smaller mean square error than 
their ordinary least square counterparts particularly when a 
high degree of multicollinearity is present. 
Hoerl and Kennard (1970), Brown and Beattie (1975), Watson 
and White (1976), and others have attempted to find an optimal 
value of K through iterative procedures. Watson and White 
found that a simple graphical device called the "ridge trace" 
is sometimes more useful as it shows the behavior of the 
coefficients under changing values of K. The estimated ridge 
coefficients are plotted against their respective value of K so 
that the ridge trace reveals the sensitivity of the 
coefficients. A coefficient insensitive to changes in the data 
will not change very much under changing values of K. 
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Let ridge regression model of grain supply be 
(6.6) GRAIN = f(GRANP, PFFCP, NFAGP, FERTP, LNDUS, YEAR, EIVGN). 
Table 6.5 summarizes the ridge results for eleven models at 
different K values. Note that because the sample size is small, 
t-ratios may provide only approximations of the significance of 
coefficients. Theil (1970) and Watson and White (1976) have 
proposed two measures to test the predictability of the ridge 
regression model. One is called the forecast root mean square 
error. The other one is named as Theil's inequality 
coefficient. Unfortunaly, the present study can not perform 
these two tests because of small sample size. Watson and White, 
among others, have approved that ridge forecast is superior to 
ordinary least squares forecast when multicollinearity exists 
and the intercorrelations among explanatory variables are 
changing. 
The results indicate that the positive coefficient on GRANP, 
grain price under ordinary least squares stabilized at negative 
sign when estimated using ridge regression. The positive 
coefficient on EIVGN, equivalent income variation of grain under 
ordinary least squares stabilized at negative sign when K values 
are higher than 0.4 in ridge regression. All other coefficients 
show same sign under the two different regression procedures. 
These results imply that coefficients of GRANP and EIVGN are 
sensitive to changes in the data while others not. These 
Table 6.5. Estimated coefficients and t-ratios of ridge regression 
K-value/ 
Variable K=0^  K=0.1 K=0.2 K=0.3 K=0.4 K=0.5 K=0.6 K=0.7 K=0.8 K=0.9 
CONSTANT -20411 -9835 
(1.93)b (2.96) 
6RANP 
PFFCP 
NFAGP 
FERTP 
YEAR 
LNDUS 
EIVGN 
24.99 
(0.10) 
220.22  
(1.90) 
-32.55 
( 2 . 0 2 )  
-317.41 
(0 .62 )  
10.51 
(1.97) 
-1.48 
(0.27) 
-16.14 
(2.08) 
125.11 
(1.19) 
-24.12 
(1.43) 
-62.65 
(0.34) 
5.31 
(3.28) 
-2.93 
(1.02) 
4.11 2.03 
(1.45) (1.35) 
-7542 -6362 -5621 -5102 -4711 -4403 -4150 -3938 
(2.66) (2.54) (2.50) (2.47) (2.46) (2.45) (2.44) (2.42) 
-58.75 -56.67 -54.91 -53.38 -51.98 -50.70 -49.51 -48.38 
(2.68) (2.97) (3.12) (3.20) (3.24) (3.25) (3.24) (3.23) 
98.07 84.15 75.47 69.45 64.96 61.45 58.60 56.20 
(0.97) (0.88) (0.84) (0.82) (0.81) (0.80) (0.80) (0.79) 
-21.31 -19.44 -18.04 -16.92 -15.98 -15.18 -14.49 -13.87 
(1.23) (1.15) (1.11) (1.09) (1.07) (1.06) (1.05) (1.04) 
-58.38 -60.08 -61.99 -63.46 -64.47 -65.09 -65.42 -65.52 
(0.34) (0.36) (0.38) (0.41) (0.43) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47) 
4.17 3.57 3.19 2.93 2.73 2.57 2.44 2.33 
(2.98) (2.89) (2.86) (2.85) (2.85) (2.85) (2.85) (2.85) 
—2.99 —2.94 —2.87 —2.80 —2.73 —2.67 —2.61 —2.56 
(1.35) (1.57) (1.73) (1.85) (1.94) (2.01) (2.07) (2.11) 
0.95 0.40 0.07 -0.15 -0.30 -0.40 -0.48 -0.53 
(0.74) (0.36) (0.07) (0.16) (0.35) (0.51) (0.65) (0.76) 
T^he coefficients and t-ratios of ordinary least squares regression when K=0. 
F^igures in parenthesis are approximate and absolute values of t-ratios. 
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results indicate that the multicollinearity problem does 
exist in the model and the problem is due to the high 
correlation between the independent variables of grain market 
price and equivalent income variation. 
A desirable procedure to search the best value of K is to 
find optimal K from the estimated data and use it to forecast 
into the unknown region. This procedure is done by means of 
the ridge trace. Figure 6.1 to 6.7 give the ridge traces for 
seven explanatory variables. These figures describe the path 
of each coefficient as K increases. The ordinary least 
squares coefficients (when K = 0) are signified by the left 
axis. 
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.7 presenting the traces for GRANP 
and EIVGN, respectively, show the severe multicollinearity 
problem. The coefficient of GRANP estimated using ordinary 
least squares method was positive. This positive sign turned 
to negative as K increased above zero. The coefficient of 
EIVGN followed the same pattern except that change in sign 
occured as K increased above 0.4. More significantly, the 
pathes of the two explanatory variables converge as K value 
increases indicating that these two variables are highly 
correlated. 
The procedure of finding an optimal K from the ridge trace 
is to search values of K greater than zero until the major 
instabilities of the coefficients have disappeared. Figure 
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Figure 6.1. Ridge trace for coefficient of GRANP 
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Figure 6.2. Ridge trace for coefficient of PFFCP 
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Figure 6.6. Ridge trace for coefficient of LNDUS 
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Figure 6.7. Ridge trace for coefficient of EIVGN 
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6.1 and Figure 6.7 show that the unstable coefficients have 
settled down in the neighborhood of K = 0.7 (see Table 6.5). 
The previous studies (Watson and White, 1976) show that this 
value corresponds with the optimal K from the forecast period 
as measured by the root of mean square error and Theil's 
inequality coefficient statistics. 
At k = 0.7 the coefficient of EIVGN is 0.4002 which is 
used as predetermined value in the estimation using Fortran 
-GQ-OPT maitaining all theoretical restrictions as discussed 
in the previous chapers. The model using fixed coefficient of 
equivalent income variation is refered to as ridge model. In 
the following study the model means this ridge model except 
otherwise indicated. The model before using ridge regression 
is called original model accordingly. 
6.1.4 Output supply and input demand equations of ridae model 
Given the coefficient of equivalent income variation 
estimated using ridge regression as predetermined, crop model 
was estimated again applying joint generalized least squares. 
The empirical results of output supply and input demand 
equations maintaining homogeneity, symmetry, and convexity are 
presented in Table 6.6. Onec again, the t-ratios reported in 
the paranthesis must be interpreted with caution since the 
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Table 6.6. Ridge model of output supply and input demand 
equations of crop sector 
GRAIN^  = -13298.05109 + 114.70518 * GRANP^  + 0.19249 * PFFCP^  
(11981.731)3 (11.677) (0.009) 
- 18.13339 * NFAGP^  - 10.26466 * FERTP^  
(1.244) (0.338) 
- 8.53604 * LNDUS^  + 7.46991 * YEAR^  
(2.430) (29.184) 
- 0.40020 * EIVGN^  
R-sguare = 0.89 
PFDFCt = -932.75325 + 0.19249 * GRANP^  + 7.39059 * PFFCP^  
(763.479) (0.009) (0.612) 
+ 0.45128 * NFAGPt - 8.17295 * FERTP^  
(0.151) (0.759) 
+ 0.05686 * LNDUS^  + 0.46736 * YEARj. 
(0.060) (6.815) 
+ 0.07649 * EIVGNt 
(0.213) 
R-square = 0.96 
F^igures in parentheses are approximate and absolute values 
of t-ratios. 
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Table 6.6. (continued) 
NFDAG^  = -599.18039 - 18.13339 * GRANP^  + 0.45128 * PFFCP^  
(174.735) (1.245) (0.151) 
+ 3.01131 * NFAGP^  + 1.79914 * FERTPx. 
(0.642) (0.431) 
+ 0.42508 * LNDUS^  + 0.27429 * YEAR^  
(0.382) (3.389) 
+ 0.08876 * EIVGNt 
(0.158) 
R-square = 0.82 
FERUS^  = 2554.34987 - 10.26466 * GRANP^  - 8.17295 * PFFCP^  
(2204.693) (0.338) (0.759) 
+ 1.79914 * NFAGP^  + 15.95033 * FERTP^  
(0.431) (1.715) 
+ 0.42298 * LNDUSt - 1.32534 * YEAR^  
(0.325) (14.239) 
- 0.09905 * EIVGNt 
(0.188) 
R-square = 0.99 
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Table 6.6. (continued) 
OFDFCtb = -2258.44153 
(5.443) 
+ 0.77201 
(3.283) 
* LNDUSt + 1.10301 * YEARu 
(5.455) 
+ 0.41175 * 
(2.530) 
EIVGN^  - 0 
N-1 N-1 
.5 Z Z bj^  EP^ j. EPjf. 
i=l j=i 
R-square = 0.83 
System statistics: 
Log-likelihood value: - 1.982 R2* = 0.99° 
T^his equation was estimated conditional on the rest of 
the crop system. Thus, N-1 includes all other netputs in crop 
sector. 
°Baxter-Craigg R-square, see text for details. 
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sample size is small. These t-ratios may only give us only 
approximations of significance of these estimates. 
In the restricted model, all of the own price coefficients 
of outputs and inputs are positive indicating that an increase 
of the ith output price will always increase the production of 
the ith output and an increase of the jth input price wll always 
decrease the use of the jth input, with other prices constant. 
This means that the estimated output supply curves are upward 
sloping and the estimated input demand curves are downward 
sloping. 
Changes in market price of grain will have two effects; 
direct and indirect. The indirect effect through equivalent 
income variation indicates how producers respond to the changes 
as a result of anticipated income effects. Note that the 
indirect effect will vanish if the state price changes by the 
same amount as the market price given the state quota constant. 
Given the negative effect of equivalent income variation 
on grain production as predetermined using ridge regression, 
equivalent income variation is positively related to all other 
agricultural supplies. This implies that if the government 
taxes grain production by either decreasing the state price 
of grain or increasing the state quota of grain, nongrain 
productions and fertilizer use will increase. This also 
indicates that the impacts of equivalent income variation of 
grain are not necessary to be negative for all production for a 
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utility maximizer under constant risk aversion. Same results 
can be derived for a profit maximizer under certainty. 
All the parameters for time trend are positive for output 
supplies and negative for (negative) input demands indicating 
progressive technical change in Chinese agriculture. However, 
as discussed previously, one is not able to determine if it is 
globle indirect Hicks neutral technical progress or technical 
changes of some other forms by the approximations of t-ratios. 
Monotonicity of expected indirect utility function (3e (U*) /  
> 0) implies that estimated output supplies and (negative) 
input demands must be nonnegative. Model simulation with 
estimated parameters proved that monotonicity was not violated 
at the sample points. 
While homogeneity in prices is ensured in normalized 
quadratic profit functional form, the symmetry property is not 
tested in the present study due to following considerations. 
The first one is to save degrees of freedom so that the 
empirical estimation can be carried out in this study given the 
small sample of data. Estimation of the model without symmetry 
restriction needs nine more parameters. However, because the 
model incorporates the current Chinese economic system, only 
observations for the years 1978 through 1988 are relevant. 
Furthermore, eigenvalue decomposition method has already made 
the model highly parameterized. The second one is that 
maintaining symmetry is necessary to test convexity when 
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eigenvalue decomposition methodology is employed. 
To test for the convexity, unrestricted model maintaining 
homogeneity and symmetry without imposing convex restriction 
needs to be estimated. The coefficients of own prices and the 
associated t-ratios from restriced and unrestricted models are 
presented in Table 6.7. Again, becuase of small sample size, 
these t-ratios can only give approximations of significance of 
these estimates. The estimates show that one out of seven own 
price parameters estimated without imposing convex restriction 
is negative. This indicates a negatively sloped output supply 
function for protein feed from crop which violates the convex 
property of the expected indirect utility function under the 
assumption of constant risk aversion. 
The convexity restriction can be imposed by the eigenvalue 
decomposition method. This methodology relies on the ground 
that a real symmetric matrix is positive semidefinite if and 
only if all its eigenvalues are nonnegative. Based on this 
property, the convexity is imposed by restricting the smallest 
eigenvalue to be nonnegative when matrix [b^ j] is 
reparameterized and implied eigenvalues are calculated. 
Estimated ridge model maintaining all theoretical 
restrictions fits the data reasonably well. R-square 
coefficients ranged from 0.82 for nonfood agriculture output 
supply equation to 0.99 for fertilizer input demand (see Table 
6.6). two of five R-square coefficients are at or higher than 
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Table 6.7. Comparision of own price coefficients of 
restricted and unrestricted ridge models^  
Unrestricted Model^  restricted ModelC 
Estimates t -ratios Estimates t--ratios 
GRANP 129.67521 0.531 114.70518 11.677 
PFFCP -5.69442 0.200 7.39059 0.612 
NFAGP 2.06847 0.789 3.01131 0.642 
FERTP 279.17617 1.168 15.95033 1.715 
BOMTP 0.00016 1.480 0.00017 2.267 
DAIRP 0.00038 0.076 0.00072 0.390 
OTHMP 0.000003 0.010 0.000004 0.230 
C^rop sector from ridge model and livestock sector from 
original model. 
C^onvexity not imposed. 
C^onvexity imposed. 
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0.95, accounting for 40 percent of the total. three out of 
five R-square coefficients are higher than 0.90, about 60 
percent of the total R-square coefficients. The generalized 
R-square measuring overall explanatory power of the ridge model 
of crop sector is 0.98 which indicates that the overall goodness 
of fit is high. 
A log-likelihood ratio test statistics is used to validate 
the ridge model. This test statistics is defined as: 
(6.7) -2 log A. = -2[log L(YQ) - log L(y*) ], 
where denotes the value of restricted maximum likelihood 
function and y* represents the value of unrestricted maximum 
likelihood function. Asymptotically, -2 log X is distributed 
as chi-square with I degree of freedom (I equaling the number 
of independent restrictions being tested) under the null 
hypothesis that y^  is true. As a result of restricting the 
coefficient of equivalent income variation equal to -0.4002 the 
value of log-likelihood function reduced from -1.8393 in the 
original model to -1.9823 in the ridge model. The calculated 
chi-square 0.286 is lower than the critical value 3.84 for 5% 
level of significance and 1 degree of freedom indicating that 
the ridge model is to be accepted. The reason that fails to 
reject the ridge model is obviously because of the problem of 
multicollinearity in the original crop model. 
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6.2 Price Elasticities of Supplies and Input Demands 
Price elasticities of output supplies and input demands are 
reported in Table 6.8. Elasticity of ith product (Y^ ) with 
respect to jth expected price (EPy) is calculated by following 
formulas at sample means: 
(6.8) = bj^ j * EPj/Yj^  V i,j except numeriare 
K 
(6.9) i^h ~ ~ ^  ^ik * EP]{./Y^  V i,k except numeriare 
k=l 
K 
(6.10) ejjj = - S bjjç * EPj^  * EPj/Yj  ^ j,k except numeriare 
k=l 
I J 
(6.11) = S S bjj * EPj * EPj/Yh V i,j except numeriare 
i=l i=l J 
where h represents the numeriare products. The elasticities 
reported in Table 6.8 are calculated using the parameter 
estimates from ridge model for crop sector reported in Table 
6.6 and from original model for livestock sector presented in 
Table 6.2. These elasticities are calculated while all 
theoretical restrictions of homogeneity, symmetry, and 
convexity are maintained. 
Because elasticities are from the model maintaining convex 
restriction, positive own price elasticities of output supplies 
Table 6.8. Price elasticities of output supplies and input demands for the full 
model with restriction of convexity 
Price/ Elasticities with Respect to 
Netput GRANP PFFCP OFFCP NFAGP FERTP BOMTP DAIRP OTHMP FEEDP 
GRAIN 0.133(0.171) 0. 001 -0. 019 -0. 145 -0. 008 
PFDFC 0.372(0.014) 0. 933 -0. 462 -0. 180 -0. 306 
OFDFC 0.315(-0.08) -0. 041 0. 070 0. 038 0. 013 
NFDAG -0.778(-1.12) -0. 047 0. 114 1. 000 0. 056 
FERUS 0.105(0.267) 0. 360 -0. 168 -0. 251 -0. 208 
BOMET 0.169 0.029 -0.042 -0.152 
DAIRY 0.119 0.025 -0.090 —0.054 
OTHEM -0.002 -0.001 0.026 -0.023 
FEDUS 0.032 0.003 0.100 -0.135 
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are preserved. But, convex restriction does not impose any 
constraint on the signs of the cross price elasticities. The 
own price elasticities for outputs distributed from 0.025 for 
dairy products to 0.100 for nonfood agricultural products. 
Nonfood agricultural product is the most elastic output. Of all 
sectors, nonfood agriculture sector has the least government 
intervention and the elastic supply function is consistent with 
this situation. Nonfood agriculture and other food have 
positive elasticities with respect to fertilizer price. 
Note that the own and cross elasticities with respect to 
grain price reported in Table 6.8 are the sum of direct price 
elasticity and indirect price elasticity. Figures in the 
parentheses are direct price elasticities. 
It is worth pointing out that the elasticities of protein 
feed from crop, nonfood agriculture, and other food from crop 
with respect to price of grain are 0.372, 0.315, and -0.778, 
respectively, while the elasticities of grain with respect to 
prices of protein feed, nonfood agriculture, and other food from 
crop are 0.001, -0.145, and -0.019, respectively. These 
phenomenon again, reflect the current situation in Chinese 
agricultural production where farmers have less flexibility to 
adjust grain production than all other nongrain production since 
grain production is under much more restrict control of the 
government, direct or indirect, than any other crop productions. 
Negative elasticities of own prices for input demands are 
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ensured as a results of imposing restriction of convexcity on 
the model. Own price elasticity is -0.208 for fertilizer and 
-0.135 for feed. As expected for the Chinese agriculture, 
fertilizer is not very elastic input because the distribution of 
fertilizer among farmers is more or less subject to the 
government intervention. Cross price elasticities vary from 
sector to sector both in sign and magnitude. Overall, the 
elasticities are plausible. 
6.3 Directly Substituting Approach 
In this study, (P - Pg)Yg was defined as equivalent income 
variation and was treated as an explanatory variable in each 
equation in the model. But, P also appeared as an independent 
variable in each equation, resulting in multicollinearity 
problem. Another method to solve the multicollinearity problem 
is called directly substituting approach by collecting same term 
and rewriting the equation arithmetically. 
To simplify the description of the approach, let start with 
a model with only price, state prices, and state quota of grain, 
(6.12) Y == aP + b(EIV) = aP + b(P - Pg)Yg 
where Y is netput, P is price of grain, Pg is the state price of 
grain, Yg is the state quota of grain, and a and b are 
parameters to be estimated. This model can be rewritten as 
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followings; 
(6.13) Y = (a + bYg)P - bPgYg, or 
(6.14) Y = CP - bPgYg, 
where c = a + bYg, or 
(6.15) Y = ap + bPYg - bPgYg, and 
(6.16) Y = ap + b^ PYg - bgPgYg. 
Equation (6.13) seems to be a reasonable one. However, 
the convexity restriction can be imposed only at the mean of Yg. 
That is, convex property is not ensured at each sample point. 
This will cause problems in policy scenario analysis by dynamic 
historical simulation. In Equation (6.14), a + bYg is set to 
be a constant. Since b is a parameter to be estimated and Yg 
is changing over time, some information must be lost if output 
supply and input demand equations are estimated using this 
Equation. 
If Equation (6.15) is used to reflect producer behavior. 
Equation (6.16) should also be estimated, so that the hypothesis 
of b^  = -bg can be tested. Let define PYg and PgYg as EVPYS 
and VPSYS, respectively, and all other definition are the same 
as those in previous models. Estimated crop supply and input 
demand equations by model (6.15) are reported in Table 6.9. As 
a result of restricting b^  = -bg, the value of log-likelihood 
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Table 6.9. Substituting model of output supply and input demand 
equations of crop sector 
GRAIN^  = -16039.99907 + 133.21335 * GRANP^  + 27.54120 * PFFCP^  
(2255.917)3 (3.399) (0.811) 
- 21.13374 * NFAGPt - 143.67235 * FERTP^  
(1.408) (1.924) 
- 7.21659 * LNDUSt + 8.75780 * YEAR» 
(2.443) (40.358) 
- 8.1D-13 * EVPYSt + 8.1D-13 * VPSYS^  
(6.0D-7) (6.0D-7) 
R-square = 0.91 
PFDFCt = -1730.24107 + 27.54120 * GRANP» + 7.32504 * PFFCP^  
(599.721) (0.811) (0.274) 
+ 0.26841 * NFAGPt - 56.40407 * FERTP^  
(0.062) (1.764) 
- 0.01176 * LNDUS» + 0.87485 * YEAR^  
(0.008) (8.508) 
- 0.32410 * EVPYS» + 0.32410 * VPSYS^  
(0.634) (0.634) 
R-square = 0.93 
F^igures in parentheses are approximate and absolute values 
of t-ratios. 
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Table 6.9. (continued) 
NFDAG^  = -838.84717 - 21.13374 * GRANP^  + 0.26841 * FFFCP^  
(36.343) (1.408) (0.062) 
+ 1.62913 * nfagpt + 5.43316 * fertp^ 
(0.709) (0.574) 
+ 0.38320 * LNDUS^  + 0.39871 * YEAR». 
(0.607) (7.830) 
+ 0.33260 * EVPYSt - 0.33260 * VPSYS^  
(1.419) (1.419) 
R-square = 0.88 
FERUS^  = 7708.32364 - 143.67235 * GRANP^  - 56.40407 * PFFCP^  
(4140.866) (1.924) (1.764) 
+ 5.43316 * nfagpt + 308.87861 * fertp^ 
(0.574) (7.385) 
- 0.07933 * LNDUS^  - 3.88308 * YEAR^  
(0.028) (19.050) 
+ 1.20449 * evpyst - 1.20449 * vpsys^ 
(1.021) (1.021) 
R-square = 0.82 
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Table 6.9. (continued) 
OFDFCtb = -2247.20977 + 0.28297 * LNDUS^  + 1.13094 * YEARj. 
(2.731) (0.606) (2.825) 
+ 0.24955 * EVPYSt - 0.24955 * VPSYS^  
(0.844) (0.844) 
N-1 N-1 
— 0.5 S EPj^  
i=l j=l 
R-square = 0.70 
System statistics: 
Log-likelihood value: - 2.340 R^ * = 0.99° 
T^his equation was estimated conditional on the rest of 
the crop system. Thus, N-1 includes all other netputs in crop 
sector. 
*^ Baxter-Craigg R-square, see text for details. 
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function changed from -4.852 in the model without restriction 
to -2.340 in the restricted model. The calculated chi-square 
5.024 is lower than the critical value 9.488 for 5% level of 
significance and 4 degree of freedom. This log-likelihood ratio 
test statistics suggests that the model with restriction of 
= -bg be accepted. 
Estimated model with restriction on alternative signs and 
equal magnitudes of b^  and bg maintaining all theoretical 
restrictions fits the data reasonably well, as implied by 
R-square coefficients (see Table 6.9). 
Price elasticities of output supplies and input demands are 
presented in Table 6.10. Most of the estimates of elasticities 
are plausible. However, elasticity of fertilizer demand with 
respect to fertilizer price is -4.027. This very high 
elasticity does not reflect the behavior of demand for 
fertilizer in China. Fertilizer is not such elastic input in 
Chinese agriculture. Elasticities of protein feed with respect 
to price of grain is also very high (3.567). Furthermore, as 
the coefficients of EVPYS and VPSYS are very small (8.1D-13), 
elasticities of grain with respect to state price and state 
quota of grain are approximately zero, implying that the state 
price the state quota of grain have no impacts on grain supply. 
This does not reflect the Chinese economic system. Thus, ridge 
model is more appropriate for policy scenario analysis. 
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Table 6.10. Price elasticities of output supplies and input 
demands for the substituting model with restriction 
of convexity 
Price/ Elasticities with Respect to 
Netput GRANP PFFCP OFFCP NFAGP FERTP 
GRAIN 0.199(0.199)* 0.070 0.008 -0.169 -0. 108 
PFDFC 3.567(2.052) 0.925 -0.976 0.107 —2. 108 
OFDFC 0.139(-0.009) -0.085 0.208 0.194 0. 108 
NFDAG 2.601(-1.31) 0.028 0.571 0.541 0. 168 
FERUS 1.711(3.734) 2.484 -1.434 -0.756 -4. 027 
F^igures in parentheses are estimates of direct 
elasticities with respect to price of grain. 
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6.4 Nested Model 
In the present study nonjolntness between crop and 
livestock sectors is assumed. This assumption does not allow 
the interaction between the two models. However, as genaral 
multioutput models the interaction among all outputs and input 
is permitted within each individual model. This means that 
production of one output is allowed to respond to changes in 
prices of all other outputs within its sector. While this is 
a logical implication of a multioutput technology in general, 
it is not necessary that every output will respond to changes 
in prices of all other outputs. This is especially striking 
in the Chinese agriculture because in China some crops are grown 
on and some livestocks are raised in geographically different 
regions and the infrastructure facilities are poor. It is 
possible that non-jointness among outputs exists within own 
sector. Because the t-ratios reported in Table 6.2 and Table 
6.6 give us only approximations of significance of these 
estimates due to small sample size, we need to test non-
jointness of the models. This can be done by the means of the 
"nested model", that is, the models are reestimated by setting 
bj^ jS, the coefficients of cross output prices be zero. 
Elasticity estimates from crop and livestock nested models 
maintaining symmetry and convexity are presented in Table 6.9. 
As it is shown in Table 6.9 that three b^ j coefficients in crop 
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model and three coefficients in livestock model are 
restricted to zero in the nested models. It is hypothesized 
that cross price elasticities estimated using nested model would 
be bigger in magnitude compared to the corresponging full model. 
The elasticity estimates reported in Table 6.11 indicate, 
however, that in crop nested model out of sixteen cross price 
elasticities only five are bigger than those in full model, 
similar phenomenon can also be observerd in livestock nested 
model. Among six cross price elasticities one is smaller than 
the corresponding one in the livestock full model. 
A log-likelihood ratio test statistics is used to validate 
the nested models (see Equation 6.7). As three b^ j coefficiens 
are restricted to zero, the value of log-likelihood function 
decreased from -1.9823 in full ridge model to -2.7824 in nested 
ridge model. The calaulated chi-square is lower than the 
critical value 7.81 for 5 percent level of significance and 
three degree of freedom suggesting that the nested model is 
accepted. The statistical acceptance of the nested crop model 
is, however, possibaly because estimation of the nested model 
requires less information compared to full model. Since the 
sample size in this study is small, it is, thus, risky to 
statistically accept the nested model. Futhermore, the 
coefficient of equivalent income variation was arrived when all 
cross effects were accounted (see Equation 6.4) in the ridge 
regression. This coefficient was then used as predetermined 
Table 6.11. Price elasticities of output supplies and input demands for the nested 
model with restriction of convexity 
Price/ Elasticities with Respect to 
Netput GRANP PFFCP OFFCP NFAGP FERTP BOMTP DAIRP OTHMP FEEDP 
GRAIN 0. 010(0.048) 0. 000 0. 026 0. 000 -0. 022 
PFDFC -0. 012(0.000) 0. 061 0. 021 0. 000 -0. 082 
OFDFC 0. 037(-0.08) 0. 002 0. 136 -0. 061 -0. 00002 
NFDAG 0. 349(0.000) 0. 000 -0. 178 0. 186 -0. 008 
FERUS 1. 364(0.752) 0. 097 0. 001 0. 037 -0. 886 
BOMET 0.169 0.000 0.000 -0.169 
DAIRY 0.000 0.033 0.000 -0.033 
OTHEM 0.000 0.000 0.106 -0.106 
FEDUS 0.035 0.002 0.456 -0.493 
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value in both full model and nested model. As the nested model 
was estimated under the hypothesis that some cross effects do 
not exist, it may lead inconsistent conclusion using an 
estimated coefficient reflecting full effects as a predetermined 
value when estimating the nested model. 
Three b^ j coefficients are restricted to zero in livestock 
nested model. The value of log-likelihood function decreased 
from -0.2225 in full model to -2.2633 in nested model. The 
calculated chi-square is lower than the critical value 7.81 for 
5 percent level of significance and three degree of freedom. 
This statistical indication implies that the nested model is 
true. However, for the same reason of small sample size it is 
not safe to accept nested model. 
6.5 Validation of the Model 
Since the restricted model is to be used for policy 
scenario analysis of the effects of the government intervention, 
the validation of the model must be first examined. Validation 
of the model is to evaluate its overall ability to reproduce the 
actual historical data of the endogenous variables. A criterion 
employed to validate a model is the fit of the individual 
variables in a simulation context. One way to measure the model 
is to conduct a historical simulation and examine how closely 
each endogenous variable tracks the historical data series over 
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the same sample period. Good historical simulation provides 
added reliability to the policy scenario analysis based on the 
model. 
The estimated equations of seven output supplies and two 
input demands in full models (ridge full model for crop sector) 
are used for the historical simulation. The sample period that 
the historical simulation series ranges from 1978 to 1988. 
The statistics to measure the model•s simulation performance 
include mean absolute percent error (MAPE) and Theil's forecast 
statistics. 
MAPE measures the average of the absolute difference 
between the actual historical series (A^ ) and simulated series 
(S^ ) relative to the actual historical series. MAPE is 
calculated by the formula: 
T 
(6.17) MAPE = (1/N) S I(At - St)I/At, 
t=l 
where T is the number of periods of simulation. The MAPE 
implies a linear loss function. Small MAPE indicates good 
simulation performance while large MAPE poor simulation 
performance. 
Three Theil's forecast statistics decomposed from mean 
square error: Uj^ , Ug, and are used in the evaluation. These 
decomposition measures are given by; 
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(6.18) = T*(Ms - Ma) / S (At - 8^ )2, 
t=l 
T 2 (6.19) Ug = T*(ag - *%) / Z (At - St)2, and 
t=l 
T , 
(6.20) U„ = 2T*(1 - p)*(e_ - a_) / S (At - St)^ , 
t=l 
where a^ , and are the means and standard deviations 
of the series At and St» respectively, and p is their 
correlation coefficient. Ug, and U^  are called the bias, 
the variance, and the covariance proportions, respectively. The 
bias proportion U^  ^is an indication of systematic error, since 
it measures the extent to which the average values of the 
simulated and actual series deviate from each other. The 
variance proportion Ug indicates the ability of the model to 
replicate the degree of variability in the variable of interest. 
The covariance proportion U^  shows unsystematic error. The 
perfect correlation of the simulated values with actual values 
would imply the ideal distribution over these three sources as 
Ujjj = Ug = 0 and Ug = 1 (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). 
Mean absolute percent errors and Theil's forecast error 
decomposition proportions are presented in Table 6.12. Out of 
nine equations, MAPE for seven equations are well below 5 
percent. MAPE for the remaining two equations are at about 8 
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Table 6.12. Simulation statistics of the estimated full model 
with the restriction of convexity 
Theil's Forecast Error Statistics 
Equation MAPE Bias(U^ ) Variance(Ug) Covariance(U^ ) 
GRAIN 2.79 0.000 0.032 0.968 
PFDFC 4.50 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OFDFC 1.52 0.000 0.019 0.981 
NFDA6 10.32 0.000 0.005 0.995 
FERUS 2.18 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BOMET 1.49 0.001 0.001 0.998 
DAIRY 2.18 0.000 0.003 0.997 
OTHEM 3.94 0.000 0.006 0.994 
FEDUS 8.19 0.000 0.018 0.982 
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and 10 percent, respectively. The bias proportions for all 
equations are zero except for bovine and ovine meat product 
supply which is at 0.001, indicating that there is no systematic 
bias in the model. The actual and the simulated series fitted 
very well. The variance proportions for all the nine equations 
are small in magnitude with the highset one at 0.032. Finally, 
all the covariance proportions are either one or close to one. 
In general, the model performs very well in tracking the actual 
values. Figures 6.8 to 6.16 plot the predicted versus actual 
values of seven output supplies and two input demands. 
To be careful to reject nested model in favor of full 
model, the validation statistics for nested model are presented 
in Table 6.11. The results indicate that bias proportion 
statistics for other food from crop is 0.993, which is too high 
such that the covariance proportion is only about 0.065. Such 
high bias proportion and low covariance proportion coefficients 
indicate that the nested model can not simulate the Chinese 
agricultural output supplies and input demands well. This 
findings support the conclusion that the full model is a better 
model in reflecting current Chinese agriculture than the nested 
model. 
Overall, the validation statistics reported in Table 6.10 
indicate that the restricted full model simulates the Chinese 
agricultural output supplies and input demands satisfactorily. 
This satisfactory simulated model provides us further confidence 
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Table 6.13. Simulation statistics of the estimated nested model 
with the restriction of convexity 
Theil's Forecast Error Statistics 
Equation MAPE Bias (U^ )^ Variance (Ug) CovariancefUg) 
GRAIN 3.60 0.000 0.033 0.967 
PFDFC 2.91 0.000 0.006 0.994 
OFDFC 4.91 0.993 0.002 0.065 
NFDA6 10.20 0.000 0.054 0.946 
FERUS 3.09 0.000 0.001 0.999 
BOMET 1.78 0.001 0.002 0.997 
DAIRY 2.64 0.000 0.004 0.996 
OTHEM 4.42 0.000 0.005 0.995 
FEDUS 8.90 0.000 0.002 0.998 
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that the estimated model maintaining all theoretical 
restrictions adequately incorporates the production technology 
under current mixed system of planning and markets. Hence, the 
model can be used for policy scenario analysis. 
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7 POLICY SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
For the main objective of this study, to analyze the 
impacts of the policy instruments on the Chinese agriculture, 
the estimated output supply and input demand equations with 
policy variables developed in the preceding chapter are used to 
evaluate the comparative static results using dynamic policy 
simulation exercises. The exogenous policy variables are 
parametrically changed, the dynamic results with and without 
the shock are compared, and inferences are made août the impacts 
of these policy instruments on Chinese gricultural production 
and input usage. 
Two agricultural policy scenarios are assessed for the 
simulation period from 1978 through 1988. The first policy 
scenario is a 10 percent increase in the state price of grain 
commodity. The second one is a 10 percent rise of the state 
quota of grain sold to the state at the low state prices. 
Because nonjointness between crop and livestock sectors is 
assumed, the reported potential impacts of policy scenarios 
exclude the livestock sector. 
7.1 Impacts of the State Price 
The dynamic simulation results of a 10 percent increase in 
the state price of grain supply over the periods 1978 to 1988 
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are presented in Table 7.1. To better evaluate the impacts, the 
results are reported in base-run, scenario-run, and percent 
changes of scenario figures over the baserun. 
The theoretical immediate impacts of an increase in the 
state of grain commodity, as discussed in the preceding 
chapters, are comprehensive. However, there are two, among 
others, significant effects. One is that the producer 
equivalent income variation is reduced, which will increase the 
total grain production. But, recall that the impacts on other 
production may not be necessarily negative for a utility 
maximizer. The other immediate effect is that changes in the 
state price of grain will alter the distribution of the market 
price of grain. This in return will affect the grain production 
as well as other output supplies and input demands. Because no 
adequate data allow to assess the dynamic relations between the 
state prices and market prices, what reported in this study is 
only the immediate impacts through equivalent income variation. 
In other words, it is assumed that increase in the state price 
of grain commodity has no effects on the distribution of the 
market price of grain commodity. 
As theoretically expected, a ten percent increase in the 
state price in all years during the period 1978 through 1988 
resulted in positive impacts on grain production, however, 
negative effects on others. Thus, the overall effect on crop 
production is ambiguous. During the same period, grain 
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Table 7.1. Dynamic impacts of a sustained increase in the state 
price of grain by ten percent on crop sector 
Base/ 
Variable Scenario 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
GRAIN Base 218.277 240.641 249.881 257.021 274.854 
Scenario 218.709 241.247 250.364 257.527 275.368 
% change 0.198 0.252 0.193 0.197 0.187 
PFDFC Base 
Scenario 
3.221 
3.139 
% change -2.558 
3.891 
3.775 
-2.984 
4.173 
4.081 
-2.215 
4.495 
4.399 
5.140 
5.042 
-2.140 -1.902 
OFDFC 
NFDAG 
Base 
Base 
Scenario 
41.265 40.960 41.270 41.379 
4.136 
4.040 
3.573 
3.439 
5.368 
5.261 
6.824 
6.712 
41.900 
Scenario 40.821 40.336 40.774 40.858 41.371 
% change -1.076 -1.523 -1.202 -1.258 -1.262 
5.741 
5.627 
% Change -2.319 -3.758 -1.984 -1.646 -1.977 
FERUS Base 
Scenario 
8.939 11.309 11.994 12.931 15.149 
8.832 11.159 11.875 12.806 15.002 
% change -1.197 -1.326 -0.992 -0.967 -0.838 
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1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
Table 7.1. (continued) 
287.050 282.211 294.886 303.789 301.792 306.656 
287.700 282.915 295.603 305.517 302.656 307.409 
0.226 0.249 0.243 0.569 0.286 0.246 
5.666 
5.542 
-2.192 
43.027 
42.359 
-1.552 
5.979 
5.835 
-2.408 
16.777 
16.616 
-0.960 
6.297 
6.163 
-2.132 
45.077 
44.352 
-1.608 
8.103 
7.947 
-1.928 
17.542 
17.367 
-0.998 
6.505 
6.368 
-2.103 
43.399 
42.662 
-1.699 
7.954 
7.795 
-1.998 
18.386 
18.209 
-0.963 
6.447 
6.117 
-5.117 
45.008 
43.230 
-3.950 
7.385 
7.002 
-5.191 
19.225 
18.797 
- 2 . 2 2 6  
7.404 
7.239 
-2.235 
45.224 
44.334 
-1.968 
8.407 
8.215 
- 2 . 2 8 6  
20.267 
20.053 
-1.056 
7.217 
7.073 
-1.993 
47.236 
46.461 
-1.636 
9.296 
9.129 
-1.798 
20.832 
20.646 
-0.893 
274.278 
275.001 
0.259 
5.496 
5.358 
-2.506 
43.249 
42.505 
-1.703 
6.615 
6.455 
-2.481 
15.759 
15.580 
-1.129 
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production increased from 0.187 percent in 1978 to 0.569 
percent in 1986, août 0.259 percent on average. A ten percent 
percent increase in the state price of grain brought about 
negative impacts on the productions of protein feed, other food 
from crop, and nonfood agricultural products. Decreasing rate 
in protein feed production ranged from -1.902 in 1982 to -5.117 
in 1986. The average change rate over the sample period was 
about -2.506. Other food production decreased from -1.076 
percent In 1978 to -3.950 in 1986, about -1.703 percent decrease 
per year. Production of nonfood agriculture decreased by an 
average -2.481 percent as a result of ten percent increase in 
the state price of grain products. The results show that 
farmers intend to produce more grain products and less protein 
feed from crop, other food from crop, and nonfood agriculture if 
the state price of grain increases. 
Since as a result of a ten percent increase in the state 
price of grain, grain production goes up while all other 
nongrain productions go down, the net effects of increase in the 
state price on fertilizer use is negative, ranging from -0.838 
to -2.226, about -1.129 on average. That is, the decrease in 
demand for fertilizer by nongrain crop is greater than the 
increase in demand for fertilizer by grain crop. Consequentely, 
demand for fertilizer by crop sector is going down. Thus, the 
overall effects of a ten percent increase in the state price of 
grain on crop sector is mixed. These results confirm the 
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theoretical argument made in the previous chapters that, for a 
utility maximizer, increase in the state price is not 
necessarily leading to increase in all individual crop 
production. 
7.2 Impacts of the State Quota 
In this scenario, the state quota of grain output that 
farmers have an obligation to sell to the state at the state 
price increased by ten percent while all other things being 
equal. The dynamic simulation results of a ten percent increase 
in the state quota of grain are reported in Table 7.2. Unlike 
the changes in the state price, increase in the state quota will 
only have direct impacts on farmers anticipated income level; 
farmers' equivalent income variation which then affects farmers 
production decision making. Increase in the state quota has 
nothing to do with the distribution of market price directly. 
A ten percent increase in the state quota of grain sold to 
the state at the state price also has mixed effects. In other 
words, effects of an increase in the state quota of grain on 
production and input use varied from crop to crop and from year 
to year. As increase in the state quota of grain will reduce 
farmers' equivalent income variation, grain production decreased 
by an average of -0.134 percent during the same period, ranging 
from -0.035 percent in 1987 to -0.267 percent in 1978. An 
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Table 7.2. Dynamic impacts of a sustained increase in the state 
quota of grain by ten percent on crop sector 
Variable 
Base/ 
Scenario 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
GRAIN Base 218.277 240.641 249.881 257.021 274.854 
Scenario 217.694 240.031 249.491 256.680 274.529 
% change -0.267 -0.253 -0.156 -0.133 -0.118 
PFDFC Base 3.221 3.891 4.173 4.495 5.140 
Scenario 3.333 4.007 4.247 4.561 5.203 
% change 3.468 2.992 1.782 1.460 1.217 
OFDFC Base 41.265 40.960 41.270 41.379 41.900 
Scenario 41.866 41.588 41.672 41.729 42.235 
% change 1.456 1.532 0.974 0.847 0.798 
NFDAG Base 4.136 3.573 5.368 6.824 5.741 
Scenario 4.265 3.709 5.455 6.899 5.814 
% change 3.127 3.793 1.622 1.106 1.264 
FERUS Base 8.939 11.309 11.994 12.931 15.149 
Scenario 9.083 11.460 12.091 13.016 15.230 
% change 1.612 1.335 0.809 0.657 0.535 
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Table 7.2. (continued) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Average 
287.050 282.211 294.886 303.789 301.792 306.656 274.278 
286.675 281.754 294.673 303.582 301.686 306.468 273.930 
-0.131 -0.162 -0.084 -0.068 -0.035 -0.061 -0.134 
5.666 6.297 6.505 6.447 7.404 7.217 5.496 
5.738 6.385 6.553 6.487 7.424 7.253 5.562 
1.265 1.393 0.734 0.619 0.272 0.499 1.427 
43.027 45.077 43.399 45.008 45.224 47.236 43.249 
43.413 45.547 43.655 45.221 45.333 47.429 43.608 
0.898 1.043 0.590 0.473 0.241 0.413 0.842 
5.979 8.103 7.954 7.385 8.407 9.296 6.615 
6.062 8.204 8.009 7.431 8.430 9.338 6.923 
1.393 1.251 0.694 0.620 0.275 0.447 1.418 
16.777 17.542 18.386 19.225 20.267 20.832 15.759 
16.870 17.655 18.448 19.276 20.294 20.879 15.846 
0.554 0.644 0.337 0.265 0.133 0.256 0.646 
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increase in the state quota of grain has, however, positive 
impacts on all other nongrain production. Production of protein 
feed from crop increased from 0.272 percent in 1987 to 3.469 
percent in 1978, resulting an average of 1.427 percent increase 
per year. The positive effects of a ten percent increase in 
the state quota can also be found on the productions of other 
food from crop and nonfood agriculture. During the same 
historical period, production of other food from crop increased 
by an average of 0.842 percent and production of nonfood 
agriculture increased by an average of 1.427 percent. This 
mixed effects on crop production result in an increase in 
fertilizer use at an average of 0.646 percent per year. This 
is because the increase in demand for fertilizer by nongrain 
crop, as a result of increase in nongrain production, is higher 
than the decrease in demand for fertilizer by grain crop as 
grain production is reduced. The results reported in Table 
7.2 confirm the argument the increase in the state quota of 
grain sold to the state at the low state price does not 
necessarily have negative effects on individual crop production 
for a utility maximizer, given other things being equal. 
By comparision of absolute percentage of changes in crop 
sector due to a ten percent increase in the state price of grain 
and a ten percent increase in the state quota of grain, one can 
find that changes in the state price of grain has more 
significant impacts on output supplies and input demand than 
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changes in the state quota of grain. This finding reflects the 
real policy structure in China. This result suggests that the 
government should increase the state price of grain rather than 
decrease the state quota of grain if grain production is a 
higher priority. 
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8 SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Summary 
The two major objectives of the present study are: (1) to 
construct a theoretical model of the farm producer decisions on 
the output supplies and input demands incorporating current 
Chinese mixed system of planning and markets; and (2) to 
estimate the supply and input demand system maintaining all 
theoretical restrictions. 
Policy variables were directly modeled into producer 
objective function. Producer decision rules on output supplies 
and input demands were explored in the theoretical framework of 
microeconomics. When there is no uncertainty involved, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for profit maximizers much 
like those for producers in the market economy are directly 
applicable. As the state prices are lower than market prices 
and the state quotas are lower than the production, the state 
prices and the state quotas have no impacts on producer marginal 
decision making. Only market prices affect the marginal 
decision making for output supplies and input demands. However, 
the state prices and quotas do matter in determining maximum 
attainable profits. When producers are subject to price 
uncertainty, the producer marginal decision rules involve not 
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only market prices but also the state prices and the state 
quota. 
A multioutput-multiinput technology in a dual framework was 
employed for the present study. Output supply and input demand 
equations for risk averse producers were derived from a specific 
utility function and a normalized quadratic profit function. 
The derived supply and input demand system prossesses all 
theoretical properties of monotonicity, homogeneity, symmetry, 
and convexity. 
The complete model consists of seven outputs (grain, 
protein feed, other food from crop, nonfood agricultural 
products, bovine meat, dairy products, and other meat), two 
variable inputs (fertilizer and feed), two fixed inputs (land 
and livestock inventory), two policy variables (the state price 
of grain and the state quota of grain sold to the state at the 
state price), and a time variable. 
Two submodels, crop and livestock, were separately 
estimated using annual data for the period from 1978 to 1988. 
Maximum likelihood methods by Fortran-GQ-OPT were used in the 
estimation maintaining all the theoretical restrictions. 
Empirical results are consistent with the theoretical 
microfoundations. The elasticity estimates are plausible and 
meaningful. The statistics of model validation in a historical 
simulation indicated that this model performed satisfactorily. 
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The estimated model was then used to analyze two policy 
scenarios. One is a ten percent increase in the state price of 
grain sold to the state. The other one is a ten percent 
increase in the state quota of grain that farmers have 
obligation to sell to the state at the state prices. The 
results showed that both scenarios have mixed effects. Effects 
of an increase in the state prices of grain is positive on 
grain production and negative on all nongrain crop production. 
Production of grain increased by an average of 0.259 percent. 
Productions for protein feed, other food from crop, and nonfood 
agriculture decreased by an average of -2.506, -1.703, -2.481 
percent, respectively. The overall effects on crop production 
resulted in a decrease in use of fertilizer by -1.129 percent 
on average. 
If the state quota of grain increased ten percent in the 
sample period, effects on crop production and input use were 
also varied. Production of grain decreased by -0.134 percent 
on average. Increase in grain quota have positive impacts on 
the productions of all nongrain products. Protein feed from 
crop was found to go up on an average of 1.427 percent per year. 
Other food from crop increased by 0.842 percent per year on 
average. Nonfood agriculture were observed to increase at an 
average rate of 1.418 percent a year. Fertilizer use was found 
to increase as the state quota of grain increased. 
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8.2 Conclusions 
The policy conclusion drawn from the dynamic simulation of 
the effects of the government policy scenarios for the Chinese 
agriculture can be summarized as follows. 
First, the state prices and the state quotas work jointly 
like producer tax dispensing with producer equivalent income 
variation. The impacts of the equivalent income variation on 
farmers' maximum attainable profits are negative. However, for 
a constant risk aversion producer, the effects of changes in the 
state prices or the state quotas on individual crops are not 
alike. The government should raise the state prices of grain 
or/and reduce the state quotas of grain if grain production is 
a higher priority in the Chinese economic development. This 
policy scenario can, however, reduce productions of protein 
feed, other food from crop, and nonfood agriculture. If the 
state prices are reduced or/and the state quotas are increased, 
the opposite results would be observed. Changes in the state 
price of grain has more significant impacts on crop sector than 
changes in the state quota of grain. 
Second, changes in expected market prices of grain have two 
effects, direct and indirect. The indirect effect through the 
equivalent income variation indicates how farmers respond to the 
changes as a result of anticipated income effects. The indirect 
effect will vanish if the state price changes by the same amount 
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as the expected free market price given the state quota 
unchanged. The policy to be drawn involve the importance of not 
ignoring the free market in such mixed systems. It is the free 
market price that primarily determines decisions of producers. 
But, if the free market is treated as a residual in the state 
planning process, unintended price variations may have 
significant impacts on producer resource allocation decisions 
and incomes. Both the planning and market sectors must be taken 
into account in formulating state planning targets so the mixed 
system of planning and markets can be working well. 
More generally, the results indicate that modern 
microeconomic theory can be used to analyze mixed systems of 
planning and markets. The combination of a microeconomic 
theory and structural policy specification in dual system 
provides the basis for operational policy analysis system that 
can be effectively used in developing countries. 
8.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
Because the model is developed for the current Chinese 
economy, only very short historical period exists for observing 
the economy even if all statistical data after 1978 are 
available. A strong assumption of nonjointness between crop 
and livestock sectors has been made in estimation due to the 
limitation of the availability of adequate data and the small 
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number of observations. This assumption should be relaxed as 
more statistical data become available. 
Also because of the limitation of adequate data, the 
current study used highly aggregated commodity classification. 
If more detailed commodity grouping is used as the more 
observations become possible, the empirical findings of policy 
analysis would be more interesting. And, hence, more valuable 
policy inference from empirical results will be made. 
The present model for the Chinese agriculture does not 
contain consumer demand for agricultural commodities and input 
supply equations as well as nonagricultural sector. Thus, 
results of the empirical policy analysis are only partial in 
nature because no simultaneous price determination mechanism was 
incorporated. The policy impacts can be fully captured if 
policy implementation is constructed in a general equilibrium 
model. 
Furthermore, this study does not involve financial and 
monetary markets. Government policy alternatives in these areas 
are not incorporated in determining agricultural supplies and 
input demands in this model. Incorporating these policy 
variables in the model may generate different empirical results 
of policy analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.l. Production of tuber and soybeans and their share in 
total grain production^  
Grain Tuber Soybean Tuber + Soybean/ 
Year Production Production Production Total Grain 
1978 304.77 31.74 7.57 12.90% 
1979 332.12 28.46 7.46 10.82% 
1980 320.56 28.73 7.94 11.44% 
1981 325.02 25.97 9.33 10.86% 
1982 354.50 27.05 9.03 10.18% 
1983 387.28 29.25 9.76 10.07% 
1984 407.31 28.48 9.70 9.37% 
1985 379.11 26.04 10.50 9.64% 
1986 391.51 25.34 11.61 9.44% 
1987 402.98 28.20 12.47 10.01% 
1988 394.08 26.97 11.65 9.80% 
C^ollected from Statistical Yearbook of China, 1989 
(State Statistical Bureau, 1989). Quantities in million tons. 
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Table A.2. Grain data used for estimation® 
YEAR GRAIN GRANP GRNQS^  GRNPS° EIVGN 
1978 218. 10 602. 00*^  41. 978 256 
o
 
o
 14524 .388 
1979 247. 26 602. 00 47. 555 300 
o
 
o
 11888 .750 
1980 238. 35 550. 00 44. 094 304. ,00 9921. 150 
1981 252. 62 529. 00 49. 094 316. ,00 10800. 680 
1982 270. 57 536. 00 53. 142 328 .00 10150 .122 
1983 291. 51 519. 00 73. 405 329 .00 14460 .785 
1984 305. 45 526. 00 83. 982 319 .00 16460 .472 
1985 284. 33 515. 00 71. 627 382 
o
 
o
 9239 .883 
1986 303. 36 511. 00 75. 049 445 .00 5628 .675 
1987 310. 48 520. 00 76. 701 463 
o
 
o
 12042 .057 
1988 295. 03 620. 00 73. 227 496 .33 15426 .732 
®See Table 5.1 for variable explanation and data sources. 
G^rain output sold to the state at the state price. Data 
were calculated by the formula expressed in Chapter 5. 
T^he state price of grain. Data from 1978 to 1983 were 
collected from China Trade and Price Statistics; 1952-1983 and 
1988 (State Statistical Bureau, 1984, 1989) and from 1984 to 
1988 were calculated according to the formula described in 
Chapter 5. 
S^incs market price of grain in 1977 is not available, it 
is set equal to the market price of grain in 1978. 
184 
Table A.3. Other data used in the estimation^  
YEAR PFDFC OFDFC NFDAG BOMET DAIRY OTHEM 
1978 3. 381721 42. 152048 4. 355302 0. 950 2 .819 1 .746 
1979 3. 589446 40.375008 3. 950347 1. 086 2 .945 1 .944 
1980 3. 986926 41. 276128 4. 314205 1. 256 3 .137 2 .119 
1981 4. 995923 40. 030176 5. 630856 1. 282 3 .328 2 .199 
1982 5. 372530 41. 523744 7. 186606 1. 390 3 .714 2 .360 
1983 5. 538893 44. 018464 6. 456290 1. 497 4 .002 2 .463 
1984 6. 014861 44. 802469 8. 242928 1. 633 4 .434 2 .785 
1985 6. 430641 44. 550128 8. 395777 1. 782 4 .823 3 .202 
1986 6. 382493 45. 170432 6. 445998 1. 979 5 .320 3 .478 
1987 7. 171000 46. 625000 8. 641000 2. 026 5 .411 3 .502 
1988 7. 590000 46. 219000 9. 147000 2. 146 3 .707 3 .707 
S^ee Table 5.1. for variable explanations and data sources. 
Table A.3. (continued) 
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YEAR PFFCP OFFCP NFAGP BOMTP DAIRP OTHMP 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
617 
644 
785 
863 
928 
993 
1054 
1166 
1199 
1304 
1320 
996 
942 
1112 
1228 
1359 
1488 
1522 
1529 
1869 
1644 
1931 
2152 
2165 
2685 
3245 
2781 
2724 
3561 
3623 
3077 
3491 
4438 
1742 
1836 
1983 
2079 
2349 
2447 
2625 
2664 
3407 
3195 
3766 
164 
181 
181 
195 
177 
217 
241 
247 
304 
315 
371 
19856 
28147 
28792 
34589 
31786 
22677 
23322 
24417 
30734 
48976 
57730 
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Table A.3. (continued) 
YEAR FERUS FEDUS LNDUS NANIN FERTP FEEDP 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
8.840 
10.863 
12.694 
13.349 
15.134 
16.598 
17.398 
17.758 
19.306 
19.993 
21.420 
8138.552 
9070.176 
9218.375 
9378.546 
9675.689 
10761.633 
12513.572 
14039.402 
14062.901 
14614.036 
16902.087 
150.104 
148.477 
146.379 
145.157 
144.755 
143.993 
144.221 
143.626 
144.204 
144.957 
144.869 
523.538 
541.954 
574.196 
564.416 
554.731 
558.643 
543.564 
547.318 
547.100 
595.087 
602.721 
223 
231 
236 
237 
243 
260 
259 
322 
370 
381 
428 
1.291 
1.192 
1.279 
1.355 
1.512 
1.611 
1.588 
1.726 
1.799 
1.978 
2.248 
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Table A.4. Data used to derive 
use& 
Divisia Index for feed input 
Feed from Grain Feed from Bovine Meat 
Year Quantity^  Price° Quantity Price 
1977 2808 150 0.0550 582 
1978 2998 180 0.0550 449 
1979 3188 180 0.0550 554 
1980 3118 190 0.0550 573 
1981 3250 220 0.0605 582 
1982 3711 230 0.0660 585 
1983 4454 220 0.0649 587 
1984 5091 270 0.0682 611 
1985 5135 260 0.0715 758 
1986 5432 330 0.0748 781 
1987 6635 320 0.0767 921 
Q^uantities in 10 thousand tons and prices in Yuan/10 
thousand tons. Collected from FAO aggregates except otherwise 
indicated. It is assumed that previous products are used as 
this year's feed input uses. 
P^rovided by China Statistical Information and Consultancy 
Service Center, State Statistical Bureau of the People's 
Republic of China. 
P^rices in 1978, 1980 and 1983-1987 are collected from 
China Rural Statistics, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988 (State 
Statistical Bureau, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988). The rest are 
the estimates derived by time trend method based on available 
data. 
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Table A.4. (continued) 
Feed from Dairy Product Feed from Protein Feed 
Year Quantity Price Quantity Price 
1978 24.9031 37 101.6921 607 
1979 25.9872 46 117.0532 626 
1980 26.9430 49 127.9711 771 
1981 29.2845 53 150.1614 846 
1982 31.1089 59 166.2732 927 
1983 34.7955 67 193.8927 989 
1984 35.8867 63 185.8934 1042 
1985 41.1272 62 214.3645 1144 
1986 42.6320 75 212.7652 1169 
1987 46.2358 89 201.1075 1235 
1988 49.9327 94 235.9391 1283 
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Table A.4. (continued) 
Year 
Feed from Other Food Divisia Index^  
Quantity Price Quantity Price 
1978 533.7701 1062 813855.17 1.291 
1979 616.4440 757 907017.57 1.192 
1980 587.3036 860 921837.46 1.279 
1981 605.3948 908 937854.56 1.355 
1982 606.6197 975 967568.85 1.512 
1983 645.0074 1063 1076163.30 1.612 
1984 758.6565 1070 1251357.20 1.588 
1985 822.2160 974 1403940.20 1.726 
1986 816.8496 1154 1406290.10 1.799 
1987 844.4182 1001 1461403.60 1.978 
1988 882.5078 1552 1690208.70 2.248 
d^ ee Chapter 5 for the discription of Divisia Index. 
